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NOTES & COMMENTS
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 1983 AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AFTER MONELL
INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 18711 (the Act), codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1983, was enacted to combat persistent southern law-
lessness during the post-Reconstruction Era.2 Specifically, the Act
was intended to open the doors of the federal courts to individuals
deprived of federally secured rights by persons acting "under color
of" state law.3 For many years, however, the remedial purposes of
I Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The Act of April 20, 1871, has been termed
variously the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Ku Klux Klan Act and the "third force bill."
Throughout this Note, it will be referred to simply as the "Act."
I During the debates on the Act, numerous congressmen adverted to the state of lawless-
ness widely believed to be prevalent in the southern states. See, e.g. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 332 (1871) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE] (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id. at 428 (remarks
of Rep. Beatty); id. at 460-61 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id. at 504 (remarks of Sen. Pratt).
Others, however, were openly skeptical of assertions that the problem was widespread and
questioned whether lawlessness existed at all. See, e.g., id. at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur);
id. at 462 (remarks of Rep. Roberts).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1 of the Act was first codified in 1875 as R.S. §§ 563,
629, 1979 (2d ed. 1878). The first two sections embodied the jurisdictional provisions of the
Act, while the third contained the Act's substantive protections. R.S. § 1979 was later incor-
porated in Title 42 of the United States Code.
As codified, the substantive component of § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
The jurisdictional grant of § 1 of the Act is now embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976)
which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. ...
Although it has been noted that § 1343(3) affords the jurisdictional basis for the § 1983
cause of action, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1976); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
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section 1983 went largely unfulfilled because of narrow judicial in-
terpretations of its provisions. 4 It was not until 1961, when the Su-
preme Court in Monroe v. Pape' interpreted "under color of" state
law in a broad manner,6 that section 1983 again became a poten-
tially significant vehicle for redressing deprivations of civil rights.'
At the same time, however, the Court held that municipalities are
absolutely immune from liability under section 1983.8 Ultimately,
this latter development provided the impetus for individuals who
had been deprived of their civil rights by local government activities
or policies to seek redress directly under the fourteenth amend-
ment.' The need for such a cause of action may have been obviated,
543 (1972), it is not clear whether § 1343(3) affords federal courts power to adjudicate all
claimed deprivations of federal statutorily derived rights.
While a claim for redress of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws" is embodied
in § 1983, § 1343(3) jurisdiction is afforded for suits to vindicate rights created by federal
statute only to the extent that such enactments "provid[e] for equal rights of citizens." 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). Despite the difference in statutory language, most commentators
have argued that § 1343(3) should be interpreted to grant jurisdiction to all § 1983 claims.
See, e.g., Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84,
112-13 (1967); Note, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.: Jurisdictional Ramifications, 24
STAN. L. REv. 1134, 1145 (1972). The circuits, however, currently are split. Compare Andrews
v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975), and Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 359 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) (no § 1343(3) jurisdiction to adjudicate claim that state
welfare regulations violate Social Security Act), with Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 839 (4th
Cir. 1974) (§ 1343(3) to be construed as broadly as § 1983). Although the Supreme Court
reserved the question in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974), the issue may be
resolved this term when the Court decides Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978). See generally Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immun-
ity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1483 n.1 (1977).
Although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 suits, Long v. District of
Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (supplemental opinion on rehearing), the over-
whelming majority of such cases are prosecuted in the federal courts.
I For example, during the period from 1871-1920, only 21 § 1983 suits were commenced.
See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26
IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
The Monroe Court determined that "under color of" state law encompassed action in
violation of state law as well as that pursuant to, or authorized by, state law. Id. at 184-85;
see note 28 and accompanying text infra. In addition, the Court held that the existence of
state-created remedies does not affect the availability of federal relief. 365 U.S. at 183.
1 In contrast to § 1983's desuetude during the first 50 years of its life, see note 4 supra,
13,000 civil rights actions were instituted in the federal courts during the year ending June
30, 1977. Not all of these suits, however, were based on § 1983. See AnMINIsTRATivE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIECTOR 82, Table 11. See also
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitu-
tional Protections (pt.1), 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.2 (1974).
8 365 U.S. at 187, 192; see notes 22-33 and accompanying text infra. Subsequent judicial
interpretations of "persons" liable under § 1983 built upon this doctrinal foundation to
restrict § 1983 liability to natural persons. See notes 36 & 41 infra.
9 See notes 97-117 and accompanying text infra.
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however, as the Supreme Court, in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, "o recently overruled Monroe and stripped municipalities of
their absolute immunity from section 1983 liability."
This Note will first review judicial interpretation of the scope
of section 1983 with respect to the question of municipal liability.
It will be suggested that the Monell Court's inclusion of municipali-
ties as "persons" for purposes of section 1983 will, in all likelihood,
foreclose resort to the constitutionally derived remedy. In contrast,
Monell should provide the impetus for renewed use of the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction in the section 1983 context. Finally, it ap-
pears that Monell, read in conjunction with modern Supreme Court
analysis of the interplay between the eleventh and fourteenth
amendments, will terminate the absolute immunity from section
1983 liability that to date has been accorded state governments.
MUNICIPALITIES AND § 1983: AN OvERvIEw
Following passage of the post-Civil War amendments, numer-
ous attempts were made by the federal government to guarantee the
civil and political rights of those recently freed from slavery." Yet,
ratification of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments and pas-
sage of the first three Civil Rights Acts had done little to halt wide-
spread persecution of emancipated blacks and others sympathetic
to the Union.1 3 Particularly egregious were the much-publicized
"outrages," attributed to extremist organizations such as the Ku
Klux Klan." In response to this situation, President Grant, in 1871,
recommended immediate passage of a bill designed to combat the
10 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
" Id. at 2035.
2 Five major civil rights acts were enacted between 1866 and 1875: Act of April 9, 1866,
ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing "Black Codes"); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 14, 16 Stat. 140
(protecting voting rights); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (protecting voting rights);
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (providing means to suppress civil disorders); Act of
March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions).
'" See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 277, 279-80 (1965); Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARV. L. Rv. 1133, 1153 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
14 During the debates, a massive compilation of accounts of Klan activities was available
to the participants. See S. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1871). The debates are replete
with reference to the Klan's depredations. See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 2, at 429 (remarks of
Rep. Beatty); id. at 448 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id. at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id. at
504 (remarks of Sen. Pratt). Further, it was acknowledged by Congress that local law enforce-
ment agencies and the courts acquiesced in this situation. See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 2, at
368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon); id. at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id. at 477 (remarks of
Rep. Dawes); id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. Pratt).
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lawlessness then existing throughout most of the South.'5 This bill,
H.R. 320, containing what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was enacted less
than 1 month later. 6
Despite its promise as a tool for protecting and enforcing indi-
vidual civil rights, section 1983 was utilized sparingly for a period
of 90 years. 7 One reason for this was that courts narrowly construed
the "rights, privileges and immunities" protected by the statute. 8
Further, the phrase "under color of' law, contained in the statute,
was interpreted to apply only in situations where state law author-
ized the state or local official's conduct. 9 By the middle of the
'1 President Grant's message stated in pertinent part:
A condition of affairs now exists in some of the states of the Union rendering life
and property insecure, and the carrying of the mails and collection of revenue
dangerous. . . . That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of state
authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States,
acting within the limits of the existing laws is sufficient for present emergencies is
not clear.
GLOBE, supra note 2, at 299.
," The Act was entitled "An Act to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." See CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 335 (1871) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE APP.].
I See Developments, supra note 13, at 1169.
,S The statement of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230), that the "privileges and immunities" protected by article
IV encompassed "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety," was frequently
referred to by participants in the debates on H.R. 320 as determinative of the "rights, privi-
leges and immunities" safeguarded by § 1 of the Act. See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 334 (remarks
of Rep. Hoar); id. at 501 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen); GLOBE APP., supra note 16, at 69
(remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
Shortly after the passage of the Act it became clear that the substantive rights contained
in it would be read narrowly by the Court. Specifically, the "privileges and immunities"
protected by the fourteenth amendment were limited to rights intimately bound up with the
existence of the federal structure. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-
80 (1872). Until 1939, the reach of § 1983 was restricted to situations involving racial discrimi-
nation and deprivations of voting rights. See Shapo, supra note 13, at 282-84; Developments,
supra note 13, at 1167. Then, in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), a Jersey City ordinance
prohibiting public meetings, absent issuance of a permit by local officials, was declared
unconstitutional by a divided Supreme Court. Id. at 516. In so holding, the Court broadened
the "privileges and immunities" protected by the fourteenth amendment and enforceable
under § 1983 to include freedom of speech and assembly. Id. at 519. Finally, the scope of §
1983 was significantly expanded when many of the protections in the Bill of Rights were made
applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See, e.g., Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969) (fifth amendment prohibition against double jeop-
ardy); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (sixth amendment right to compulsory
process); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (sixth amendment right to confront
witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-42 (1963) (sixth amendment right to
counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-66 (1962) (eighth amendnient prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-55 (1961) (fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule).
IS Soon after passage of the Act, judicial interpretation of the scope of "state action"
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twentieth century, however, judicial interpretation of this phrase as
it appeared in the criminal counterpart to section 19830 became less
restrictive. An action was considered to have been taken "under
color of' state law where it involved the "[m]isuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."'" Finally, in
1961, the Supreme Court applied this concept in the context of a
section 1983 suit.
In Monroe v. Pape,22 thirteen Chicago police officers, acting
without a warrant, allegedly forced their way into the plaintiffs'
home in the predawn hours. 3 James Monroe and his family were
awakened at gunpoint and made to stand naked in their living
room." After a destructive search of the premises and the physical
abuse of members of the family, Monroe was taken to a police sta-
tion where he was detained and interrogated for 10 hours without
the benefit of counsel. 5 Following Monroe's release without criminal
charges being preferred against him, 6 the plaintiffs brought a sec-
tion 1983 damage action against the city and the individual officers
alleging deprivations of their constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 27 The Supreme Court, broadly
under the fourteenth amendment and, by analogy, of "under color of" law in the § 1983
context, restricted actionable conduct to that authorized by state law. See, e.g., Barney v.
City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1904); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18
(1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318-22 (1879). See generally Developments, supra note
13, at 1156-61; see also Shapo, supra note 13, at 282-87; Note, Damage Remedies Against
Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922, 949-51 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Damage Remedies]; Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L.
REV. 1285 (1953).
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). Section 242 originally was enacted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27. It was reenacted in substantially
similar form in the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 140.
21 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). In Classic, criminal charges were
brought against election officials for the fraudulent tabulation of primary votes; conduct that
clearly violated state law. In a later case, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), a
Georgia sheriff was charged with the fatal bearing of a young black arrestee. Both courts
broadly interpreted the "under color of" state law requirement found in § 1983's criminal
analogue, 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976)). In Screws, Justice
Douglas observed that the defendants "acted without authority only in the sense that they
used excessive force in making the arrest effective. It is clear that under 'color' of law means
under 'pretense' of law. Thus, acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are
plainly excluded." 325 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added).
- 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
' Id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
24 Id.
21 Id; see id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 169.
2 See id. at 169, 171.
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construing the phrase "under color of" law, reversed the dismissal
of the Monroes' complaint as to the individual defendants.1 Signifi-
cantly, however, the Monroe Court affirmed the dismissal as to the
city, finding that Congress intended to exclude municipalities from
the scope of section 1983.25 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
noted that during debates on the Act, Senator Sherman had offered
an amendment which would have held "the inhabitants of the
county, city, or parish" liable to injured persons for specified acts
of violence." When this proposal was twice rejected by the House
of Representatives, 1 it was replaced by a new section omitting any
provision for municipal liability.3 2 Relying on congressional antipa-
thy to the Sherman amendment, the Court could not "believe that
the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include
[municipalities] ."3
The absolute immunity from section 1983 damage liability ac-
Is Id. at 187. The Monroe Court initially considered whether conduct made illegal by
state law was "under color of" law for purposes of § 1983. Id. at 191. The defendants argued
that since Illinois prohibited the actions of the policemen, an adequate state law remedy was
available to the plaintiffs which in turn foreclosed resort to federal court. Id. at 172. Based
on an extensive review of the applicable legislative history, see id. at 171, 173-83, 185, Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, rejected this approach to § 1983. Id. at 183-85. Justice
Douglas found that the three principal purposes of the Act were to "override. . . state laws"
which infringed upon the rights or privileges of citizens of the United States, to afford "a
remedy where state law was inadequate," and "to provide a federal remedy where the state
remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." Id. at 173-74. In summary,
Justice Douglas believed it
abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance
or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Id. at 180.
In contrast, taking a narrow view of the liability of the individual defendants under §
1983, Justice Frankfurter stated that Congress intended to create "a civil liability enforceable
in the federal courts only in instances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts
because some 'statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage' sanctioned the grievance
complained of." Id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In addition, he posited that the
Court's expansive interpretation of "under color of" law would have deleterious consequences
for federal principles "long regarded as critical to the most effective functioning of our federal-
ism." Id. at 241-42 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
n Id. at 190-92.
Id. at 188.
" Id. at 188-89 & nn.40, 42.
3 Id. at 189-90.
3 Id. at 191. Justice Douglas principally relied on a statement by Representative Poland,
one of the amendment's opponents, that "the House had. . . decided that. . . Congress had
no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations." Id.
at 190 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 2, at 804 (remarks of Rep. Poland)).
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corded municipalities by the Monroe Court was strictly adhered to
in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. For example, in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno,34 the Court rejected the argument that the
Monroe limitation applied only to actions for damages,-" and
thereby foreclosed the possibility of obtaining equitable relief
against a municipality under section 1983.11 As a result of this seem-
ingly absolute limitation placed on the reach of section 1983, more
circuitous approaches to municipal liability were essayed. In Moor
v. County of Alameda,37 42 U.S.C. § 198838 was used in an attempt
u 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
1 Id. at 513.
3 In Kenosha, several "dram shop" proprietors commenced a § 1983 action against the
cities of Racine and Kenosha alleging that their due process rights had been infringed when
the cities denied their liquor license renewal applications. Id. at 508. The Court held that the
declaratory and injunctive relief requested was foreclosed by its holding in Monroe. Id. at 513.
Raising the jurisdictional issue sua sponte, id. at 511 (citing Louisville & Nash. R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)), the Court found that municipalities were "outside of
[§ 1983's] ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages." 412 U.S. at 513.
Significantly, however, the Kenosha Court had no occasion to reach the issue whether equita-
ble relief under § 1983 was possible when sought against individual municipal officers sued
in their "official" or "representative" capacities. This "loophole" in Kenosha, see Levin,
supra note 3, at 1496-1504, was soon detected by lower federal courts. See id. at 1500-01 &
n.67 (collecting cases). The practical importance of permitting official-capacity suits seek-
ing injunctive relief is significant, since the effect of any ordered relief on the governmental
employer is indistinguishable from that which would result from allowing the remedy to run
directly against the governmental entity. See id. at 1502 n.76, 1504-18.
The significance of the Monroe-Kenosha determination that local government entities
could never be § 1983 defendants, regardless of the relief sought, was eroded still further when
monetary awards, such as backpay, were allowed as an element of equitable relief. See, e.g.,
Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1205 (4th Cir. 1975) (backpay); Incarcerated Men
of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 288 (6th Cir, 1974) (attorney's fees). Even where
equitable relief is granted, the costs of compliance can be substantial. See Frug, The Judicial
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978). See generally Levin, supra note 3, at 1504-
18. This paradox, whereby the costs of relief ordered in "official-capacity" suits would be paid
by local government entities, despite Monroe and Kenosha, was avoided by other lower
federal courts. These courts relied on Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), where the
Court refused to award monetary relief in the nature of equitable restitution against state
officials sued in their official capacities, see note 50 infra, and, by analogy, refused to approve
relief involving monetary compensation ultimately payable from the treasury of a local gov-
ernment entity. See, e.g., Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499, 501 (5th Cir. 1976)
(en banc), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3117 (1978); accord, Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 265-67 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
37 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred on the district courts by [the Civil
Rights Acts] . . . .for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity
with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same
into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies . . . , the common law, as
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to incorporate California's waiver of governmental immunity, and
its imposition of vicarious liability on counties for the acts of their
employees, into the law of section 1983 .3 This device failed, how-
ever, as the Court found unpalatable the "wholesale importation"
of state law into federal law under section 1988.10 The Supreme
Court further manifested its reluctance to empower the federal
courts to adjudicate section 1983 claims against municipalities
when it held that, absent an independent basis of federal jurisdic-
tion over a municipal corporation, the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion could not be utilized to confer jurisdiction on a federal court to
hear a state cause of action against the corporation.4
modified. . . by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction of such civil . . . cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
411 U.S. at 698.
Id. at 703-04. Moor arose out of the "police riot" which occurred during the infamous
People's Park confrontations in Berkeley, California in the spring of 1969. Under CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 815.2(a) (Deering 1973), the county could have been subjected to damage liability for
the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a respondeat superior basis. 411 U.S. at 696,
710 n.27. The Court determined that § 1988 is not an independent" 'Act of Congress provid-
ing for the protection of civil rights'" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4). Instead,
the Court found that § 1988 merely was "intended to complement the various [civil rights]
acts which do create federal causes of action." 411 U.S. at 702.
" Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). In the post-Monroe era, the lower federal
courts consistently held that states were not "persons" for § 1983 purposes. To some extent
this was based upon the eleventh amendment bar to suits against states in the federal courts.
See notes 168-192 and accompanying text infra. See generally L. Tasw, AzasCAN CONSnrru-
TioNAL LAW ch. 3, §§ 3-34 to -38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TaRmE]; Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Contro-
versies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 682 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Intergovern-
mental Immunities]. In addition, some courts reasoned that since municipalities are im-
mune from § 1983 liability and are political subdivisions of the states, then a fortiori states
must also be immune. See, e.g., Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 587 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); United States v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84, 86 n.2
(3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
452 (1976) (since Monroe held municipalities were not § 1983 "persons," states similarly
could not be liable under § 1983).
A variety of state and local entities have been held not to be "persons" within the reach
of the § 1983. See, e.g., White v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 566 F.2d 906, 909 (5th Cir. 1978)
(school district); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1249 (6th Cir. 1974) (city
planning commission); Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (state parole
board and department of correctional services). But see Keckeisen v. Independent School
Dist., 509 F.2d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975) (school boards);
Aurora Educ. Ass'n East v. Board of Educ., 490 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 985 (1974); but cf. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-79
(1977) (reserving question of amenability of local school boards to suit under § 1983).
Courts disagreed, however, whether "independent agencies" were § 1983 persons.
Compare Muzquiz v. City of San Antohio, 520 F.2d 993,996-1001 (5th Cir. 1975), and Forman
v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub
19781
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In 1978 the Court took the opportunity to fully reconsider the
Monroe decision. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,12 the
plaintiffs brought suit under section 1983, alleging that written
municipal policies violated their constitutional rights.13 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs challenged the pregnancy leave policies of their
employers, the City of New York and the New York Board of Educa-
tion," that forced pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of ab-
sence regardless of their ability to continue to work.'- Although
nom. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 846 n.11 (1975), with Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 262-64 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2018
(1978), and Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499, 500 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3117 (1978).
In resolving this question the courts typically inquired whether the agency performed a
"vital government function," possessed independent powers in carrying out its function, and
determine how its funds would be spent (or to what extent it would be funded in the first
instance). See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 263-64 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978); Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir.
1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975). Also, the courts analyzed the agency's status under local or state law and whether
it, or a local or state government, would pay a judgment. Monell v. Department of Social
Serv., 532 F.2d 259, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). See also Develop-
ments, supra note 13, at 1194-95 & nn.35-36.
Both the District of Columbia, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973), and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, see, e.g., Carreras Roena v. Camara de
Comerciantes Mayoristas, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 217, 218-19 (D.P.R. 1976), aff'd mem., 559 F.2d
1201 (1st Cir. 1977), were found to be outside the scope of "person" under § 1983.
12 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
' Id. at 2021. An amended complaint, alleging a claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, was filed in September 1972. Id. at 2020 n.1. In 1972, the class of employers who
could be sued under Title VII was expanded to include "governments, governmental agencies
[and] political subdivisions." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976), as amended by Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103.
11 98 S. Ct. at 2020. The New York City Department of Social Services was also a named
defendant, but the plaintiffs conceded that the Department was indistinguishable from the
City for § 1983 purposes. Id. at 2021 n.4; see 532 F.2d at 263. In addition to the Board of
Education and the City of New York, several individual officials were named as defendants
in their "official" capacities. 98 S. Ct. at 2021.
Individual city and board officials, in this case the department's commissioner, the
board's chancellor and the city's mayor, although sued in their official capacities, have always
been considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Greene v. City of Mem-
phis, 535 F.2d 976, 979 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 527 F.2d 1262, 1263
(2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716-17 (8th Cir. 1974). Indivi-
dual government officers typically are sued in their "official" capacities when declaratory or
injunctive relief is sought. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Gay Students Organiza-
tion v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974). The official-capacity defendants-those charged
with administering or formulating the offending policies-are assumed to be in the best
position to effectuate any remedial modifications ordered by the court.
98 S. Ct. at 2021. The arbitrary and mechanical requirement that all pregnant employ-
ees must take unpaid leave as of a specified point in a pregnancy has been held to constitute
an "irrebutable presumption." See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-48
(1974); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 1973).
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subsequent changes in the maternity leave regulations mooted the
plaintiffs' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, their back-
pay claims survived.46 The district court denied recovery as to all
defendants, '7 reasoning that Monroe forbade anypayment of money
damages that would necessarily and ultimately be borne by a mu-
nicipal government.48 On appeal, the second circuit held that the
board of education was not a person within the meaning of section
198311 and that, although local officials sued in their official capacity
were, damages could not be assessed against them since any such
award ultimately would be paid by the city." The Supreme Court,
11 See 98 S. Ct. at 2021. The amended policies allowed pregnant employees to continue
working so long as they were physically able. The change in the city's regulations was effective
January 29, 1972. 532 F.2d at 261. The Board's policy modification took effect in September
1973. Id.
1, 394 F. Supp. 853, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court did find, however, that the maternity
leave policies, prior to modification, were unconstitutional. Id. at 855.
R See id. at 855; note 50 infra.
532 F.2d at'264. The Supreme Court, in Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 279 (1977), reserved the question whether courts could award money damages
against an "independent" agency such as a local school board. Lower federal courts have been
grappling with this issue on a case-by-case basis. See 532 F.2d at 263. Some circuits have
held that school boards are not persons within the ambit of § 1983. See, e.g., White v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 566 F.2d 906, 909 (5th Cir. 1978); Adkins v. Duval County School Bd.,
511 F.2d 690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1975); Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429,
430 (4th Cir. 1974). Others have found that money damages may be properly awarded against
school boards. See, e.g., Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062, 1065 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975); Aurora Educ. Ass'n East v. Board of Educ., 490 F.2d
431, 435 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985 (1974); Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 F.2d
741, 743-44 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Note, Suing the School Board Under Section 1983, 21
S.DL. REv. 452 (1976).
The Monell court reviewed a number of second circuit decisions in which the State
University of New York, the New York City Employees' Retirement System and the New
York City Transit Authority had been held not to be "persons," and concluded that the
entities sued in the instant case were immune under § 1983. 532 F.2d at 263. The court noted
that while the Board possessed "certain independent powers," such as the "right to determine
how the funds appropriated to it shall be spent," it had no control over the amount to be
apportioned. Id. (citation omitted). The court also considered several cases which involved §
1983 suits against school boards wherein the merits had been reached, and concluded that
such precedent was not binding since, in each case, the jurisdictional issue had not been
adjudicated. Id. at 264; see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). The Hagans Court
stated that "when questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio,
this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the juris-
dictional issue before us." Id. at 535 n.5.
532 F.2d at 264. The question whether backpay could be assessed against officials sued
in their "official capacity" was resolved by the court by drawing an analogy to eleventh
amendment cases. Id. at 265 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)). According to
the court, where the monetary award is sought against the official and not the municipal
employer, but the employer ultimately will pay any judgment, Monroe's command that
municipalities are not amenable to suit under § 1983 is controlling. Id. at 265-66. This
"party-in-fact" analysis has been utilized by the Supreme Court in the eleventh amendment
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however, reversed and overruled Monroe "insofar as it [held] that
local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983."I'
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Brennan52 under-
took an exhaustive reanalysis of section 1983's legislative history.5 3
It was pointed out that, while the House first approved H.R. 320
without modification, a number of amendments were offered in the
Senate, including one by Senator Sherman." As introduced, Sena-
tor Sherman's proposal authorized a civil action in the federal
courts for redress of injury to persons or damage to property caused
context. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462-64 (1945). The
propriety of applying eleventh amendment principles to § 1983 suits, however, has been
questioned. See Levin, supra note 3, at 1508-15. Nevertheless, several lower federal court
decisions have utilized this eleventh amendment analogy to deny relief against local govern-
ment defendants. See Santiago v. Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana y Vivenda, 554 F.2d
1210, 1212 (1st Cir. 1977) (dictum); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.
1976) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3117 (1978); Patton v. Conrad Area School
Dist., 388 F. Supp. 410 (D. Del. 1975). But see Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1204-
05 (4th Cir. 1975); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 287-88 (6th
Cir. 1974); Dyson v. Lavery, 417 F. Supp. 103, 109 (E.D. Va. 1976); Adamian v. University
of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Nev. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Adamian
v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975).
A number of states and, presumably local governments, have obligated themselves to
indemnify officials held liable in damages. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (West
1972 & Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IowA CODE
ANN. § 613A.8 (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 17 (McKinney Supp. 1978-
1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-640 (Supp. 1977). See generally Bermann, Integrating Govern-
mental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1175 (1977); Yudof, Liability for Con-
stitutional Torts and the Risk-Adverse Public School Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1322 (1976).
It is generally agreed that a governmental entity that provides indemnification may not raise
Monroe immunity or eleventh amendment sovereign immunity as a defense. See Muzquiz v.
City of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993, 1008 (5th Cir. 1975) (Goldbold, J., dissenting in part),
rev'd en banc, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3117 (1978);
Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1974). See also
TRIBE, supra note 41, § 3-35, at 132 n.22.
98 S. Ct. at 2022.
s Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun and
Powell. Justice Stevens joined only in parts I, III and V of the majority opinion. Justice
Powell authored a separate concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion
in which Chief Justice Burger joined.
" See 98 S. Ct. at 2023-36. Justice Brennan observed that § 1 was the Act's least contro-
versial provision and was approved as introduced in both Houses. Id. at 2023. In contrast,
those provisions of H.R. 320 which established presidential power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13, and use federal troops to suppress
civil disorders, id. § 3, provided civil and criminal sanctions for participation in conspiracies,
inter alia, to deprive persons of their civil rights, id. § 2, and mandated disqualification from
jury duty for those in complicity with such unlawful combinations, id. § 5, occupied center
stage throughout the debates. 98 S. Ct. at 2023.
11 98 S. Ct. at 2023; see GLOBE, supra note 2, at 663. As noted by the Court, the Sherman
amendment was to have been appended "as an additional section" and was not intended to
modify any of the bill's other provisions. 98 S. Ct. at 2023; see GLOBE, supra note 2, at 663.
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by persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled."' 5 Justice Bren-
nan emphasized that, as introduced, this amendment "did not
place liability on municipal corporations"; rather, it imposed liabil-
ity on the inhabitants of the locality wherein the injury or damage
occurred. 6 Upon the House of Representatives' repudiation of the
Sherman amendment, the entire bill was referred to a conference
committee. 57 On April 18, 1871, the conferees reported back to their
respective houses a somewhat expanded version8 which would have
imposed liability directly upon municipalities if the individual de-
fendants could not satisfy the judgment." Although passed by the
1 98 S. Ct. at 2023. The first version of the Sherman amendment provided
[t]hat if any house .. .[or other structure] shall be unlawfully or feloniously
demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons
riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully
and with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any
persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was
committed to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such
right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such
case the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons
damnified by such offense if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead;
and such compensation may be recovered by such person or his representative by
a suit in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in
which the offense was committed,. . . and against said county, city, or parish. And
execution may be issued on a judgment rendered in such suit and may be levied
upon any property, real or personal, of any person in said county, city, or parish,
and the said county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment,
costs, and interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in
such riot in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
GLOBE, supra note 2, at 663, reprinted in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 98 S. Ct.
2018, 2041-42 (1978).
"1 98 S. Ct. at 2023. During the debates on the first conference committee revision of the
Sherman amendment, it was pointed out that a number of states had enacted riot statutes
with provisions purportedly similar to the original proposal and the first conference commit-
tee revisions of the amendment. See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 751 (remarks of Rep. Shellabar-
ger); id. at 762 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson); id. at 771 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id. at
792 (remarks of Rep. Butler). Senator Thurman, however, exposed the inaccuracies of ana-
logizing the Sherman amendment and the various state riot statutes. See id. at 771-72.
11 98 S. Ct. at 2023. While the House of Representatives approved H.R. 320 in its original
form by a vote of 118 to 91, GLOBE, supra note 2, at 522, it rejected the original Sherman
amendment overwhelmingly. Id. at 725.
1 98 S. Ct. at 2024. For the complete text of the Sherman amendment as revised by
the first conference committee, see GLOBE, supra note 2, at 749, 755, reprinted in Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2042 (1978). The various modifications were
reported to the House of Representatives by Representative Shellabarger, see GLOBE, supra
note 2, at 750-52, and to the Senate by Senator Edmunds. See id. at 756-59.
4 98 S. Ct. at 2024; see GLOBE, supra note 2, at 749, 755. This formulation of the amend-
ment also made explicit that only intentional deprivations were to be actionable, that individ-
ual offenders could be joined on the motion either of the plaintiff or the defendant municipal-
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Senate, the bill containing this version of the Sherman amendment
was overwhelmingly rejected by the House of Representatives.
Since, as Justice Brennan observed, the "sole basis" for the Monroe
Court's grant of absolute immunity to municipalities was an
"inference" drawn from the House's rejection of the Sherman
amendment, it was necessary to identify and analyze the sources of
that antipathy.6
The Court noted that proponents of the amendment believed
that Congress, in furtherance of the fourteenth amendment, could
enact legislation to enforce constitutionally protected rights against
a municipal corporation.2 House opponents, on the other hand,
ity, and that the judgment against a municipality constituted a lien upon all of its funds and
property. See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 749, 755. As in the original version of the amendment,
a municipality which had been ordered to respond in damages was subrogated to the plain-
tiffs right to recover from those who had actually caused the injury.
1 98 S. Ct. at 2024. The vote in the House was 106-74 in favor. GLOBE, supra note 2,
at 800. The second conference committee formulation, subsequently adopted as § 6 of the
Act, excised all provisions for municipal liability. In pertinent part, this version stated:
That any person or persons, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired
to be done and mentioned in the second section of this act are about to be commit-
ted, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, shall neglect or
refuse so to do, and such wrongful act shall be committed, such person or persons
shall be liable to the person injured . . . for all damages caused by any such
wrongful act which such first-named person or persons by reasonable diligence
could have prevented ....
GLOBE App., supra note 16, at 336, reprinted in part in Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 2042-43 (1978). This section of the Act may now be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1986
(1976).
a1 98 S. Ct. at 2023. In Monroe, Justice Douglas had stated that "Itihe response of the
Congress to the [Sherman amendment] was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the
word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them." 365 U.S. at 191 (footnote
omitted). This analysis of the congressional rejection of the amendment has been criticized
by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 132-36 (1972); Levin, supra note
3, at 1519-36; Developments, supra note 13, at 1192; Note, Developing Governmental Liabil-
ity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
MINN.].
;2 98 S. Ct. at 2025-27. Justice Brennan focused on the statements of Representative
Shellabarger, one of the Sherman amendment's chief proponents, in examining the position
of those in favor of the Sherman amendment. Id. at 2025. The Court first looked to Represent-
ative Shellabarger's explanation of the rights protected by § 2 of H.R. 320, which like the
Sherman amendment also implicated the constitutional authority of the federal government
to intrude in the internal affairs of the several states. 98 S. Ct. at 2025. The congressman
asserted that the "privileges and immunities" of citizens, as defined in Corfield v. Coryell, 6
F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230), had to be protected. See GLOBE App.,
supra note 16, at 68-69. This proposition was not questioned by opponents of the Sherman
amendment. See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 772 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id. at 791 (remarks
of Rep. Willard). The question, however, was the extent to which Congress could protect those
constitutional rights. Representative Shellabarger thought that legislation enacted to enforce
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stressed the significance of the difference between legislation impos-
ing an obligation to keep the peace63 and legislation merely provid-
ing a civil remedy for a municipality's failure to implement a state-
imposed obligation to do so." The prevailing view among these
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, provided the closest analogy. See GLOBE App., supra note 16,
at 70 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, which was superseded
by the thirteenth amendment, provided:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered upon Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
The constitutionally protected right of slave owners to be secure in their ownership was
implemented by the Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, which provided for the
recapture and return of runaway slaves across state lines. The constitutionality of that legisla-
tion was upheld in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). The PHigg Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Story, found the 1793 Act to be an authorized congressional
exercise under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 618-22. The
Court reasoned that should the possibility exist that state process for recovery of fugitive
slaves might tend to defeat a slaveowner's constitutionally guaranteed rights, then "the
natural inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate
authority and functions to enforce it." Id. at 614-15.
Turning to the Sherman amendment, Representative Shellabarger argued that since it
would "ensurfe] the protection which the Fourteenth Amendment made every citizen's
federal rights," 98 S. Ct. at 2027, it was "appropriate" legislation, and therefore constitu-
tional. See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 751 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 800 (remarks of
Rep. Perry). The final inquiry, then, was whether congressional imposition of an obligation
to keep the peace upon local governments was proper. See id. at 751 (remarks of Rep.
Shellabarger). By analogy, the answer was found in Board of Comm'rs v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 376 (1860) which was the first in a long line of Contract Clause cases involving suits
initiated by holders of railroad bonds to enforce payment by their municipal government
guarantors. See generally 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, 918-1116 (1971). The Aspinwall Court held
that the federal courts had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a municipal
corporation to lay and collect a tax for the purpose of satisfying the interest claims of coupon
holders. 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 384-85.
0 98 S. Ct. at 2027. Numerous congressmen observed that, at the time of the debates,
an "obligation" to keep the peace was not generally imposed by the states on town and county
governments. See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard); id. at 794 (remarks
of Rep. Poland); id. at 795 (remarks of Reps. Blair and Burchard); id. at 799 (remarks of Rep.
Farnsworth). One commentator has noted that in 1871 neither the obligation nor the where-
withal to keep the peace had been delegated to local governments. Only the largest cities of
the day, the majority of which were situated in areas unaffected by Klan violence, had police
departments. At that time, law enforcement was assumed primarily by the various states.
Kates & Kouba, supra note 61, at 135 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, HISTORY OF THE POLICE 50
(1967)). While a number of states and cities had riot statutes, see note 56 supra, it was argued
that these were radically different from the Sherman amendment. See Kates & Kouba, supra
note 61, at 135.
64 98 S. Ct. at 2030; see notes 65-67 and accompanying text infra. The Monell Court
comprehensively reviewed the decisions containing the constitutional principles espoused by
opponents of Senator Sherman's proposal. 98 S. Ct. at 2029. In the first of these cases, Prigg
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members of the House was that imposition of the latter type of
liability would have been constitutional. 5 Placing an affirmative
duty on local governments to protect their own citizens, however,
was strenuously opposed as being beyond the power of the federal
government." Since section 1, as enacted, did not impose the type
of liability which led to rejection of the Sherman amendment, the
Monell Court concluded that there was no evidence in the debates
to support the view that applying the statute to municipalities was
considered constitutionally impermissible.17
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), the Court, in addition to authorizing congres-
sional enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause, intimated that Congress could not "insist
that states . . . provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national government."
Id. at 615-16. Subsequently, in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), the Court
thought it "clear, that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to
impose on a State officer . . . any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it
possessed this power, it might overload the officer with duties which would fill up all his time,
and disable him from performing his obligations to the State .... " Id. at 107-08.
Numerous opponents of the amendment cited the principle enunciated in Dennison, see,
e.g., GLOBE, supra note 2, at 799 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth), as well as the analogous
principle of Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 2,
at 764 (remarks of Sen. Davis); id. at 777 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id. at 793 (remarks
of Rep. Poland).
0 98 S. Ct. at 2030-31. That the federal courts could decide cases involving the misuse
of authorized powers was made explicit in the Contract Clause decisions. See note 62 supra.
Several opponents of the amendment recognized that the federal courts had this power. See,
e.g., GLOBE, supra note 2, at 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard); id. at 794 (remarks of Rep.
Poland); id. at 795 (remarks of Rep. Burchard).
" As Justice Brennan noted in Monell, "[a]ny attempt to impute a unitary constitu-
tional theory to opponents of the Sherman amendment is . . . fraught with difficulties
.... " 98 S. Ct. at 2028. The basic constitutional objection to the Sherman amendment,
however, was grounded in the fact that most states did not impose peacekeeping obligations
on local government units. Since the effect of the Sherman amendment would be to require
municipalities, as a matter of federal law, to maintain public order or suffer the consequence
of suits for damages, those opposed thought the amendment unconstitutional. See GLOBE,
supra note 2, at 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard); id. at 794 (remarks of Rep. Poland); id. at
795 (remarks of Rep. Blair); id. (remarks of Rep. Burchard); id. at 799 (remarks of Rep.
Farnsworth).
Aside from objections framed in constitutional terms, some members of Congress appar-
ently objected to the amendment since it proscribed only injury resulting from "riotous and
tumultuous assemblies." This objection was based upon the fact that the Ku Klux Klan
usually eschewed "tumult and public alarm and demonstrations." GLOBE, supra note 2, at
840 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). Further, several Senate opponents objected to the
amendment on policy grounds. They believed that the lien provision in the amendment would
tend to impair a municipality's credit standing. See, e.g., id. at 762 (remarks of Sen. Steven-
son); id. at 763 (remarks of Sen. Casserly).
6, 98 S. Ct. at 2030. The Court posited other justifications for its view that the 42d
Congress did not perceive § 1 of the Act to create "the Hobson's choice of keeping the peace
or paying civil damages" that was the source of congressional antipathy to the Sherman
amendment. See 98 S. Ct. at 2030-32. Justice Brennan initially observed that Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870), exemplified the continuing vitality of the doctrine of
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Having determined that "nothing said in debate . . . would
have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1... for its
own violations of the Fourteenth Amendment,"6" the Court turned
to the question whether the Forty-second Congress intended to im-
pose section 1 liability on governmental entities as well as natural
persons. Initially it was noted that legal and natural "persons" alike
were considered by Congress to be capable of causing the depriva-
tions sought to be redressed by section 1.11 In fact, Representative
Bingham7 asserted that the uncompensated taking of private prop-
"dual" or "coordinate sovereignty," the dominant antebellum philosophy of federal-state
relations. 98 S. Ct. at 2029. See generally Developments, supra note 13, at 1138-41, 1156-61.
Day inverted the principle announced in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), that state governments had no authority to tax federal instrumentalities which were
lawfully established to effectuate federal powers. This had the effect of restricting the federal
exercise of its enumerated powers. Day was overruled in Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466,
486 (1939). Yet, despite the doctrine's vitality at the time of the debates, Justice Brennan
asserted that it encompassed no inherent limitation on the power of the federal judiciary to
interpret and enforce constitutional limitations on municipalities. 98 S. Ct. at 2031. The
Court then examined the anomalous situation in which the contracts to which municipalities
were parties in the Aspinwall line of cases were viewed by opponents of the Sherman amend-
ment to be enforceable in the federal courts, yet the imposition of damages under the amend-
ment was not. The Monell Court determined that a "violation of the Constitution was the
predicate for 'positive' relief in the Contracts Clause cases, whereas the Sherman amendment
imposed damages without regard to whether a local government was in any way at fault for
the breach of the peace for which it was to be held for damages." Id. at 2031 n.40. Thus, since
§ 1 granted jurisdiction to the federal courts to provide "positive" relief for violations of the
fourteenth amendment, the opponents of the Sherman amendment presumably would not
have objected to § 1 suits against local governments for their own infringements upon the
fourteenth amendment rights of individuals. See id. at 2031. The Court also noted that those
involved in the debates recognized that no constitutional distinction could be drawn between
individual state officials and local governments. See GLOE, supra note 2, at 795 (remarks of
Rep. Blair); id. at 799 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth). It was unquestioned, although deplored
by some, see, e.g., id. at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); GLOBE APP., supra note 16, at 217
(remarks of Sen. Thurman), that § 1 could be used against state officials. See, e.g., id. at
334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id. at 367-68 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon). Therefore, an assertion
of § 1 federal power under the Act against local governments would have been viewed as
constitutional. 98 S. Ct. at 2032.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2032. Justice Brennan noted that both proponents and opponents of § 1
agreed that it "swept very broadly." Id. at 2033 n.45. According to Representative Shellabar-
ger, "[this act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human
rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and
beneficently construed." GLOBE APP., supra note 16, at 68, quoted in 98 S. Ct. at 2032. See
also id. at 81, 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id. at 216-17 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
Representative Shellabarger observed that § l's civil remedy was meant to be available to
whites as well as to former slaves. Id. at 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
" 98 S. Ct. at 2033-34; see note 67 and accompanying text supra.
T' Representative Bingham was the principal draftsman of both § 1 and § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION.OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22 (1977); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 41-42 (1949).
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erty by a city in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore71 had influenced his
draftsmanship of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment.72 His view,
in 1871, was that section 1 of the Act provided a civil remedy for
such uncompensated takings. 73 It would be anomalous, the Court
observed, to cabin the contemplated redress to the responsible mu-
nicipal officials, since "the government unit. . . had the benefit of
the property taken. '74 Further evidence that "person" had assumed
generic significance by 1871 was discerned in the recognition by
some congressmen that "person" encompassed both commercial
and municipal corporations under the current case law.75 Finally,
barely a month before the introduction of H.R. 320, Congress had
passed what has become known as the Dictionary Act. 7 This Act
stated that, in legislation subsequently enacted, "[tihe word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate
. . . unless the context shows that such words were intended to be
used in a more limited sense. ' 77 While the inclusion of "bodies poli-
tic and corporate" in the word "person" seems to be permissive
rather than mandatory, 8 Justice Brennan reasoned that the Dic-
"1 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Barron, aside from holding the articles of the Bill of Rights
inapplicable to the states, specifically held that a city's uncompensated taking of private
property could not be redressed under the fifth amendment. Id. at 250-51.
72 GLOBE App., supra note 16, at 84.
11 See id. at 85.
11 98 S. Ct. at 2034. While federal courts have been reluctant to utilize § 1983 as a vehicle
to redress uncompensated takings of property, such suits have been allowed under the fifth
amendment, see Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1933), and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962).
See also 98 S. Ct. at 2051 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11 98 S. Ct. at 2034; GLOBE, supra note 2, at 752 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger); see, e.g.,
Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 122 (1868) (municipal corporation a "citizen"
for diversity purposes); Louisville, Cin. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844)
(corporation a "citizen" for diversity purposes); accord, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 97 (1972).
It should be noted that although commercial and municipal corporations were considered
to be "citizens" of states for purposes of art. III jurisdiction, in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 182 (1869), the Court declined to hold that such entities were "citizens" for
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Indeed, as Justice Rehnquist noted in
Monell, the one court which, by 1871, had considered the question whether a corporate body
was a "person" within the terms of the fourteenth amendment, concluded not only that a
corporation was not a "person," but that it also was not a "citizen." 98 S. Ct. at 2051
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (C.C.D.
La. 1870) (No. 7,052)).
" The Dictionary Act, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
The Dictionary Act derives its popular name from Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rav. 527 (1947). Justice Frankfurter observed that
"Congress supplie[d] its own dictionary" in passing the statute. Id. at 536.
" The Dictionary Act, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
" See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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tionary Act was meant to provide a general rule of construction. 79
The Court concluded, therefore, that absent any contextual limita-
tion, Congress intended "persons" to be read to include "bodies
politic and corporate.""0 Accordingly, the Court sanctioned imposi-
tion of liability where "the action that is alleged to be unconstitu-
tional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regu-
lation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated,"8' but ex-
pressly refused to sanction the imposition of liability on a theory of
respondeat superior.8 1
11 98 S. Ct. at 2035 n.53 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 775 (1871) (remarks
of Sen. Trumbull)).
10 Id. at 2035 & n.53. Justice Brennan observed that it would be illogical, where no
contextual limitation was present, to selectively apply the Dictionary Act. To do so would
indicate that there was no "rule" at all, a view contrary to the congressional intent as
manifested by the statute's legislative history. See id.
The Court also found support for the view that municipal corporations were included in
the phrase "bodies politic and corporate" in both contemporary case law and state statutes.
Id. at 2035 & n.51 (citing Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336); Brief for Petitioner apps. D & E, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961)).
8, 98 S. Ct. at 2036. With respect to the issue of stare decisis, both the majority and the
dissent professed adherence to the principle that previous interpretations of a statute's mean-
ing are to be accorded greater deference than previous constitutional adjudications. Id. at
2038 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 & n.14 (1974)); 98 S. Ct. at 2048 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). This "rule" is premised on the belief that Congress can always overturn
a court's interpretation of a statute. Overturning a constitutional interpretation, however,
would require a constitutional amendment. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
82 98 S. Ct. at 2036. It should be noted that Justice Brennan explicitly stated that
consideration of the issue of respondeat superior was not necessary to the Court's decision.
See 98 S. Ct. at 2038. For this rebson, Justice Stevens declined to join in Section II of the
opinion. Id. at 2047 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
The majority found support for rejecting imposition of liability on a respondeat superior
basis in both the statute's language and in its legislative history. The pertinent language of
§ 1983 suggested that the existence of an employee-employer relationship was insufficient to
fasten § 1983 liability on a municipal employer. 98 S. Ct. at 2036-37. Focusing on the "cause
to be subjected" language of the statute, Justice Brennan believed that § 1983 could not "be
easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor." Id. at 2036. According to
the Court, the House's rejection of the first conference committee's version of the Sherman
amendment, which essentially embodied a vicarious liability concept, strengthened "the
inference that Congress did not intend to impose [respondeat superior] liability." Id. at 2037
n.57. Justice Brennan acknowledged that most supporters of the Sherman amendment
viewed its provisions as operative "only when a locality was at fault or had knowingly
neglected its duty to provide protection." Id. But, he noted, at least one proponent "appar-
ently" viewed the amendment as imposing a species of vicarious liability on municipalities.
See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 792 (remarks of Rep. Butler). Moreover, the final version of the
Sherman amendment, enacted as § 6 of H.R. 320, totally excised all "elements of vicarious
liability," although it retained the essential precept that residents of a community might be
held liable for Ku Klux Klan depredations. 98 S. Ct. at 2037 n.57. Ultimately, Justice Bren-
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As it did in Monroe,83 the Court in Monell eschewed any reli-
ance on "policy" considerations in determining the amenability of
local governments to suit under section 1983 and relied solely on
legislative history. 4 This exclusive reliance on the origins of section
1983 has been severely criticized.- Such intrinsically equivocal evi-
dence is considered a poor foundation upon which to construct an
authoritative analysis of section 1983's intended scope. Yet, of all
the aids to detecting congressional purpose, verbatim transcriptions
of the debates are the truest record from which to work.87
The accuracy of the Monell Court's comprehensive analysis of
the debates seems unassailable. In fact, Justice Rehnquist, in his
dissent, could find little in the Court's exegesis of section 1983's
history with which to quarrel.8 Yet, while Monell demonstrates that
the Monroe Court erroneously equated the "obligation" imposed by
the Sherman amendment with the civil liability created by section
1 of the Act, 89 whether the Forty-second Congress affirmatively in-
tended to bring municipal corporations within the scope of
"persons" liable under section 1 is less certain. The Monell Court
tacitly acknowledged that there was little explicit congressional
consideration of municipal liability under section 1 of the Act. 0
nan had to concede that "[s]trictly speaking . . . the fact that Congress refused to impose
vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens does not conclusively establish that
it would similarly have refused to impose vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's
employees." Id. For a general discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior, see W. PRos-
SER, LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
365 U.S. at 191.
" See 98 S. Ct. at 2023-35.
Kates & Kouba, supra note 61, at 135-36. It is argued that by-products of the legisla-
tive process, debates, rejected amendments, committee reports and the like, contain support
sufficient for multiple inconsistent interpretations of congressional purpose. Id. at 135 (quot-
ing Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3
(1965)); see Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 409 (1950).
The diametrically opposed conclusions of the Monroe and Monell Courts as to the intended
reach of § 1983 do little to undermine the validity of such reasoning.
See Kates & Kouba, supra note 61, at 135-36.
"' See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 6-7 (1977).
See 98 S. Ct. at 2050-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, however, began
his discussion of § 1983's legislative history with an examination of the Dictionary Act. He
stated that, in view of the ambivalent status of commercial and municipal corporations for
purposes of constitutional analysis, the 42d Congress may well have intended "person" to
apply only to natural persons. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, the views of Repre-
sentative Bingham, see notes 70-74 supra, were judged to offer little support for the notion
that § 1 of the Act was intended to sanction relief against municipalities. 98 S. Ct. at 2051
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" See 98 S. Ct. at 2025-32.
" See id. at 2023. The Court repeatedly referred to the "limited" debate on § 1, while
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Instead, the Court inferred from section l's broad remedial scope
that "there is no reason to suppose that municipal corporations
would have been excluded from the sweep of § 1.' Further evidence
that Congress intended "persons" to include municipal corporations
was found in the allusions of several congressmen to decisions of the
Court in which both commercial and municipal corporations were
held to be "citizens" for article IlI diversity jurisdiction purposes.2
As Justice Rehnquist noted, however, it was hardly settled in 1871
that corporations, whether commercial or municipal, were
"persons" for all purposes and in all contexts. 3 On balance, though,
and particularly in light of the Dictionary Act, the Court's conclu-
sion that the Forty-second Congress meant to include municipal
corporations in the word "person" appears to be the correct one.
Monell should have significant impact on civil rights litigation
involving municipalities. It would appear that the viability and
utility of the trend permitting federal causes of action to be bot-
tomed on the fourteenth amendment has been virtually extin-
guished." On the other hand, Monell should have a catalytic effect
on the operation of pendent party jurisdiction. In addition, the deci-
sion appears to lay a foundation for state government liability under
section 1983. The balance of this Note will examine these issues.
THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSE OF ACTION
The concept of a constitutional cause of action can be traced
to the Supreme Court's recognition of an implied right of action
under the fourth amendment in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Relying on Bivens, the
noting that the other provisions of the Act were "the subject of almost all congressional
debate." Id.
" Id. at 2034.
" See GLOBE, supra note 2, at 752 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 777 (remarks of
Sen. Sherman).
98 S. Ct. at 2051 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see note 75 supra.
" See notes 120-141 and accompanying text infra.
'5 See notes 156-161 and accompanying text infra.
, See notes 164-194 and accompanying text infra.
,7 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971). Bivens involved a claim that federal agents had violated the
plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
at 397. A factual backdrop reminiscent of that in Monroe gave rise to the Bivens action.
Webster Bivens' apartment was entered by six federal agents in November 1965. After his
home was searched, he was arrested and handcuffed in front of his spouse and children. 409
F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1969). While still in his apartment, the federal agents accused Bivens
of violating the narcotics laws and threatened to arrest his family. After being transported to
a federal court building, Bivens was transferred to another federal facility where he was
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lower federal courts began to recognize an equivalent cause of action
in the fourteenth amendment context to hold local government
questioned, searched and subjected to the booking process. 403 U.S. at 389. Following his
release on bond, the charges against him were dropped. Approximately 18 months after his
arrest, Bivens filed suit against the agents involved, alleging causes of action under § 1983
and directly under the Constitution, with jurisdiction grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), respectively. Because the federal officers had not acted
"under color of" state law as § 1983 expressly required, and because Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp.
813, 816-20 (S.D. Cal. 1947), on remand from 327 U.S. 678 (1946), had determined that no
cause of action lay against federal agents for violations of either fourth or fifth amendment
rights, the district court dismissed Bivens' complaint. 276 F. Supp. 12, 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
Following a unanimous affirmance by the second circuit, the Supreme Court reversed. 403
U.S. at 390.
The Court noted that neither a statutorily based cause of action pursuant to federal law
nor adequate protection under state law was available to the plaintiffs. Id. at 395-97. The
Bivens Court accordingly held that a valid claim was stated under the fourth amendment.
Id. at 389. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Brennan cautioned against taking an "unduly
restrictive" view of the fourth amendment's remedial scope, noting that it "operates as a
limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in whose jurisdic-
tion that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a
private citizen." Id. at 391-92. Central to the Court's holding that Bivens' complaint stated
a cause of action was the recognition that if no damage remedy were implied under the
Constitution, Bivens would be left without a remedy in the federal courts for a violation by
federal agents of Bivens' federally guaranteed rights. Id. at 395-97. It was also noted that state
remedies would in all likelihood prove inadequate in situations similar to that presented sub
judice. Id. at 394-95. While the fourth amendment by its terms did not authorize damage
awards, Justice Brennan believed that the full range of remedies could be seized upon to
redress federal statutory violations. Id. at 396 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
Since damage awards were classically viewed as "the ordinary remedy for an invasion of
personal interests in liberty," 403 U.S. at 395, and "no special factors counselling hesitation"
could be discerned, the Court approved imposition of damage liability on federal officials who
violate a citizen's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 396-97.
The lower federal courts subsequently extended Bivens to vindicate constitutional pro-
tections other than those embodied in the fourth amendment. See Paton v. La Prade, 524
F.2d 862, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment); Uhited States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d
Cir. 1972) (fifth amendment); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 161-
62 (D.D.C. 1976) (sixth amendment); Patmore .v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Ill.
1975) (fifth and eighth amendments). Furthermore, numerous lower federal courts have
allowed Bivens-type actions to be brought under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. City
of West Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978); Pitrone v. Mercadante,
572 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978);
Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98
S. Ct. 3118 (1978); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 575-76
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554,
559 (6th Cir. 1976); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1976); Cox v.
Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist.,
520 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975). Only the first circuit has flatly refused to extend Bivens to
fourteenth amendment violations. Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41-44 (1st Cir. 1977).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not expressly authorized application of
the Bivens rationale to redress violations of constitutional protections other than those em-
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
units liable for their own unconstitutional practices. Turpin v. Mai-
let, 5 a decision exemplifying this extension of Bivens, was handed
down by the second circuit one day prior to publication of MonellY5
The discussion which follows will examine Turpin and assess the
availability of a constitutional cause of action against municipali-
ties now that a statutory remedy exists under section 1983.
Turpin v. Mailet
In Turpin, the plaintiff had successfully prosecuted a section
1983 suit against a West Haven, Connecticut, police officer. '"' De-
spite the fact that he had been found liable for using "excessive
force" in attempting to restrain the plaintiff, Officer Skeens had no
disciplinary action taken against him.10' This suit received much
attention within the city's police department as well as the
community-at-large. Skeens was subsequently promoted and, soon
after the first suit was concluded, Turpin was arrested again by two
other officers and charged with disorderly conduct.' When the
criminal charges were later dropped by the local prosecutor, Turpin
filed suit, alleging that the "official" response to his earlier suit,
Skeen's promotion, had created an environment in which the West
Haven police were encouraged to violate his constitutional rights.0 3
In addition to a section 1983 claim against the arresting officers,
Turpin brought a fourteenth amendment claim against the city.04
Although the district court dismissed the fourteenth amendment
claim,' it was reinstated by a divided second circuit sitting en
banc. ,01
bodied in the fourth amendment. The Court will decide this Term, however, whether a cause
of action may be stated directly under the fifth amendment. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1978).
' 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven
v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978).
,1 Turpin was decided on June 5, 1978. The decision in MoneUl was handed down on June
6, 1978.
"1 579 F.2d at 154-55. Turpin obtained a judgment of $3,500 which was ultimately paid
by the city's liability carrier. Id.
,o Id. at 155.
202 Id. The second incident apparently occurred within 3 months after the judgment in
the first suit. Id.
"I Id. at 158.
10 Id. Turpin also sought to append state law claims against the city. Id.; see CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (West Supp. 1978).
"1 579 F.2d at 155. The district court's dismissal of the fourteenth amendment claim was
consistent with the then controlling view in the second circuit. See Fisher v. City of New York,
312 F.2d 890 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963).
101 579 F.2d at 168.
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Chief Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority, 07 acknowl-
edged that the rule of Monroe prevented the plaintiff from seeking
damages from the city under section 1983.108 Since no federal statu-
tory remedy was available to vindicate Turpin's constitutional
rights, the majority considered whether it would be proper to exer-
cise its common-law function of fashioning remedies where federal
rights have been violated. 109 The majority pointed out that other
circuits had relied on the Bivens reasoning and permitted damage
suits against municipalities directly under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Accepting the premise that the Bivens rationale was not lim-
ited to redress fourth amendment violations, the Turpin court
sought to determine whether anything in the language or legislative
history of the fourteenth amendment ,would leave a federal court
without power to imply a cause of action.110 The court found no such
barrier and stated that "[i]f the judicial branch has an obligation,
independent of Congress, to enforce the terms of any constitutional
provision, certainly the fourteenth amendment should be foremost
among them.""' Moreover, the second circuit could find no
"07 Chief Judge Kaufman was joined by Judges Feinberg, Gurfein, Mansfield and Oakes.
Judge Oakes submitted a separate concurring opinion. Judge Van Graafeiland filed a dissent-
ing opinion in which Judges Meskill, Mulligan and Timbers concurred.
"1' 579 F.2d at 156.
109 Id. at 157 (citing Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975)).
"0 579 F.2d at 158-60. The city contended that the language of § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, "Congress shall have power to enforce . .. this article .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5, foreclosed the judiciary from creating a remedy. Whether § 5's grant of
power is exclusive to the legislative branch, see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-48 (1879);
Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1059 (3d Cir. 1977) (Garth J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3122 (1978), has a significant impact on whether
federal courts may imply a cause of action directly under the Constitution. The city of West
Haven relied principally on Ex parte Virginia. In that case, a Virginia state court judge had
been arrested and indicted for excluding black citizens from jury service in violation of the
Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336. 100 U.S. at 340. The statute was upheld as a
valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 349.
In discussing § 5, the Ex parte Virginia Court observed:
It is not said the judicial power of the general government shall extend to enforcing
the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed [by the
fourteenth amendment]. . . .It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged.
Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation.
Id. at 345 (emphasis in original).
The second circuit rejected the contention that the fourteenth amendment's legislative
history evinced an intent to remit enforcement exclusively to Congress. Chief Judge Kaufman
noted that Representative Bingham, § 5's framer, believed that the Supreme Court, pursuant
to § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, was empowered to enforce against the states the negative
limitations that forbade deprivations of enumerated civil rights. Id. at 159-60 (quoting GLOBE
APP., supra note 16, at 83 (remarks of Rep. Bingham), reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTz, STATUTORY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 304-05 (1970)).
"1 579 F.2d at 158; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
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"'explicit congressional declaration' antithetical to the existence of
a cause of action." ' The court looked to section 1983's legislative
history as interpreted by Monroe and its progeny,"' and observed
that it was "difficult to draw any reasoned conclusion regarding
Congress' attitude toward municipal liability. . . from the fate of
the Sherman Amendment."" 4
Since Bivens instructed "that those directly responsible for
unconstitutional behavior may be called to task for their wrongful
acts,"1 5 the creation of a constitutionally derived cause of action for
damages for fourteenth amendment violations was deemed to be
entirely appropriate." 6 The court consequently held that where
"injuries [result] from . . . actions of [municipal] employees that
[were] authorized, sanctioned or ratified by municipal officials or
bodies functioning at a policy-making level," then the municipality
may be sued for damages in the federal courts." 7
M 579 F.2d at 160.
11 Id. at 161.
M' Id. The difficulty in assessing Congress' attitude toward municipal liability is re-
flected in the divergent views of numerous commentators as to the significance of the House's
rejection of the first two formulations of the Sherman amendment. See Kates & Kouba, supra
note 61, at 136; Levin, supra note 3, at 1531; McCormack, supra note 7, at 31 n.182; Nowak,
The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments
and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLImI. L. REv. 1413, 1467-
68 (1975).
M 579 F.2d at 164. One commentator suggests that the propriety of implying a damage
remedy under any constitutional provision should depend on whether the remedy is both
"appropriate" and "necessary." See Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 770, 777-78 (1975); cf. Dellinger, Of Rights and Reme-
dies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1551 (1972) ("necessary" or
"appropriate").
MI 579 F.2d at 164 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 395).
W7 579 F.2d at 164. Chief Judge Kaufman believed that the vast potential for constitu-
tional abuse inherent in concentrated municipal power evidenced the need for judicial crea-
tion of such a remedy. Id. at 165; cf. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2910 (1978)
("[e]xtensive Government operations offer opportunities for unconstitutional action on a
massive scale"). The court, however, narrowly defined the circumstances under which munic-
ipal liability would be appropriate. Thus, imposition of liability on municipalities would be
appropriate only in instances where "the municipality, no less than the employee, has vio-
lated the Constitution." 579 F.2d at 165. In restricting municipal liability to those situations
in which the local government entity was "directly responsible" for deprivations of constitu-
tional rights, the court rejected respondeat superior as a permissible basis of liability. Id. at
166-67; cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) ("affirmative link" must be shown
between "plan or policy" formulated by official sued, and conduct said to be violative of §
1983). This reflects the court's interpretation of Bivens to require a showing that liability
would attach only to "those actors who can meaningfully be termed 'culpable.'" 579 F.2d at
166.
Although the question of immunity was not an issue under the facts of the case, the court
did mention the possibility of according municipalities some limited immunity, but only in
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The Effect of Monell on the Constitutional Cause of Action
The Supreme Court has considered the availability of a consti-
tutional cause of action only in the context of the fourth amend-
ment. The standard that has emerged from Bivens for implying
such a right is whether judicial creation of the remedy is either
"necessary" or "appropriate" to effectuate a particular constitu-
tional guarantee."' In applying this standard, those lower federal
courts that have extended Bivens to sanction a constitutionally
based cause of action against municipalities for violations of four-
teenth amendment rights have stressed the absence of a means of
redress under the then prevailing interpretation of section 1983."1
The following comparison of the constitutional cause of action and
the section 1983 remedy should serve to clarify whether the Bivens-
Turpin remedy remains "necessary" or "appropriate" after Monell.
It is readily apparent that section 1983 authorizes redress for
deprivations of rights secured both by the Constitution and federal
statutes," while the Bivens-Turpin remedy is limited to redress of
constitutional violations. 2' To the extent that most deprivations of
federal statutory rights can be framed in terms of fourteenth amend-
ment violations, 2 however, the range of illegal conduct that is ac-
tionable under the two theories would seem to be coextensive. An-
other facial distinction between the two causes of action is that
federal jurisdiction of constitutionally based causes of action is
predicated on the general federal question statute, with its attend-
the context of "actions of such extraordinary dimensions [that they] significantly threaten
municipal treasuries." Id. See also Damage Remedies, supra note 19, at 958.
"I See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 164 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368
(U.S. Nov. 28, 1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 939 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978).
" See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub
nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978); Owen v. City of
Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978);
McDonald v. State of Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1977); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532
F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1976).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
121 See Damage Remedies, supra note 19, at 952 (interest sought to be protected or
vindicated must be one "protected by the Constitution").
"' The ease with which deprivations of statutory rights may be framed as due process
violations "by any legal neophyte" was deplored recently by Justice Rehnquist. Butz v.
Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2919 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Turpin v. Mailet, 579
F.2d 152, 181 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) ("[djue process is an
open-ended, indefinite concept which defies precise definition") (footnote omitted), vacated




ant amount-in-controversy requirement.123 Thus, the potential for
dismissal of such claims would appear to be much greater than in
section 1983 actions wherein no jurisdictional amount need be satis-
fied. 24 Yet, in practice, no significant advantage accrues to the sec-
tion 1983 action in this regard, since the amount-in-controversy
requirement in Bivens-type actions has generally been applied with
a light hand.12s
With respect to the substantive elements of the two causes of
action, a broad congruence may be discerned. Most importantly,
there is general agreement on the necessity of showing that an offi-
cial municipal policy or custom caused the injury for which redress
is sought.' 26 The corollary proposition, that liability may not be
"I See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)($10,000). If enacted, H.R. 9622, which was passed by
the House of Representatives on February 28, 1978, will remove all amount-in-controversy
requirements in federal question cases and, thus, remove this distinction between the two
causes of action.
I" See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). The monetary requirement is a particular obstacle
when the complaint alleges deprivations of voting rights or violations of the first amendment.
Some lower federal courts have viewed such constitutional rights as being inherently incapa-
ble of valuation and accordingly have found that the jurisdictional amount has not been
satisfied. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1398 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 960 (1970); Calvin v. Conlisk, 367 F. Supp. 476, 483-84 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d
1, 9-10 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 424 U.S. 902 (1976).
'= A number of federal courts have taken a liberal stance and have held that an allega-
tion of a constitutional violation will be deemed to satisfy the amount-in-controversy require-
ment. See, e.g., Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); Schroth v. Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Hawaii
1973); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d
245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972). Other courts will permit aggregation of
compensatory and punitive damages in order to satisfy the requisite jurisdictional amount.
See, e.g., Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975); Hartigh v. Latin, 485 F.2d
1068, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420
F. Supp. 1384, 1387 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds,
572 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978).
I26 See 98 S. Ct. at 2036, 2038; 579 F.2d at 166-67. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976),
two class action suits seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 were instituted
by several individuals and organizations to halt alleged unconstitutional police practices.
Although the incidents involved individual policemen, the suit was brought against the mayor
and the commissioner of police. The Court held that a § 1983 claim was not stated where the
facts did not show "a 'pervasive pattern of intimidation' flowing from a deliberate plan by
the named defendants." 423 U.S. at 375 (emphasis in original) (quoting Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802, 812 (1974)). Absent an "affirmative link" between an officially adopted plan
or policy and the alleged incidents of police misconduct, § 1983 was not available for redress
of such wrongdoing. 423 U.S. at 371, 378; cf. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 830-31
(2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff need only demonstrate that supervisory-level welfare officials
"affirmatively promoted" policy which sanctioned the conduct). The Rizzo decision has been
criticized in light of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), wherein the Court posited a
"deliberate indifference" standard for imposition of liability on prison personnel whose igno-
rance of prisoners' medical needs allegedly violated eighth amendment standards. Id. at 104;
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imposed on a respondeat superior basis, is also generally applicable
for both types of actions.'1 Certain other substantive limitations
see Developments, supra note 13, at 1229-31. What is feared is that, if Rizzo's "affirmative
link" requirement is applied to § 1983 actions where equitable relief is sought against individ-
ual officers in their official capacity, as well as in damage actions, all but the most egregious
unconstitutional practices would be insulated from the reach of the statute. Another com-
mentator takes a considerably more sanguine view of Rizzo's implications for the availability
of equitable relief under § 1983. Such relief will apparently be available so long as those
officers named as defendants have the authority to correct the violations in question:
To hold, as part of the law of remedies, that no public officer can be enjoined
in his official capacity unless he has been personally involved in the government's
unconstitutional conduct would call into question a staggering number of past cases
brought against department heads, Governors, and mayors whose administrations
have issued regulations without their personal participation. . . .This standard
also would cast a shadow over the practice of substituting successor officers as
defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
Levin, supra note 3, at 1502-03 & n.76. But cf. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 98 S.
Ct. 2018, 2038 n.58 (1978) ("we would appear to have decided [in Rizzo] that the mere right
to control without any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to
supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability").
I" In Monroe, the Court, in dictum, stated that § 1983 liability would henceforth be
shaped "against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions." 365 U.S. at 187. The Monroe Court clearly implied that imposi-
tion of liability would not be permitted on a respondeat superior theory under § 1983. Id. at
191 & nn.48-49; see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710 n.27 (1973). See generally
Levin, supra note 3, at 1519-39.
Generally, the lower federal courts also have held that respondeat superior liability may
not be the basis of a § 1983 action against an individual official. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Schaefer,
548 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1977); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976); Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S.
362 (1976); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
But see Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 370 & n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d
901, 903 (9th Cir. 1971). Cf. Milburn v. Girard, 441 F. Supp. 184, 188-91, 190 n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (local government could be liable on respondeat superior theory under § 1981). See
generally Levin, supra note 3, at 1519-39; Note, Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, 6 IND.
L. REv. 509 (1973).
Monell's repudiation of respondeat superior as a basis of liability would seem to conclu-
sively resolve the issue. 98 S. Ct. at 2036. It is submitted, however, that neither the Monell
Court's textual interpretation of § 1983, nor its analysis of the significance of the House's
rejection of the Sherman amendment, compels a no-respondeat superior rule in the § 1983
context. As Justice Brennan conceded, somewhat disingenuously, "[s]trictly speaking, of
course, the fact that Congress refused to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few
private citizens does not conclusively establish that it would similarly have refused to impose
vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees." Id. at 2037 n.57.
Given the limited scope of activity and the concomitant small workforce of a municipal-
ity or local government in 1871, it is not surprising that the issue was not considered by
Congress. Additionally, as Monell makes clear, the dominant congressional concern at the
time was not appropriate theories of liability or the propriety of money damages versus
equitable relief. Rather, Congress was divided over whether the imposition of an "obligation
to keep the peace" where that duty was not imposed on local governments by state law would
be permissible. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text supra.
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apply under either approach. It would seem that the Burger Court's
reluctance to extend substantive due process protection to certain
"liberty" and "property" interests in the section 1983 context would
be applicable as well to the Bivens-Turpin type of action."" Moreo-
ver, regardless of the approach taken, compensation for constitu-
tional deprivations will be measured by actual injury,"9 with only
nominal damages awarded for the infringement itself.13
A potentially critical difference in the operation of the two
causes of action should be noted. In litigation under specified fed-
eral statutes including section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988's' mandates
that where federal law is "deficient in the provisions necessary to
furnish suitable remedies," the action should be governed by state
law insofar as there is no conflict with federal statutory and consti-
The circuits appear to be in disagreement over whether liability may be imposed on a
respondeat superior basis when one sues directly under the Constitution. See Lehmann,
Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed
by Government Officials, 4 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531, 572 nn.260-61 (1977); Levin, supra note
3, at 1522 n.158. While Turpin appears to represent the majority view, a strong case can be
made that, as a matter of federal common law, municipalities should be so liable. See
Lehmann, supra, at 575; cf. Pitrone v. Mercadante, 572 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir.) (per curiam)
(Gibbons, J., concurring), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978).
"I The Court's holding in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), seems likely to have a
powerful limiting effect on the availability of § 1983 relief for certain types of injury. Paul
involved a § 1983 suit seeking damages and equitable relief for inclusion of the plaintiff's
photograph and name in a flyer distributed to local merchants advising them of the identities
of "active shoplifters" in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The plaintiff had been arrested once
on shoplifting charges, but had not been prosecuted prior to issuance of the flyer. Those
charges were eventually dismissed, after distribution of the flyer had been completed. Id. at
695-96. While the sixth circuit ruled that plaintiff's reputation was an interest deserving of
due process protections under the fourteenth amendment, 505 F.2d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1974),
the Supreme Court disagreed. Distinguishing a number of its own precedents, see 424 U.S.
at 701-10, the Court observed that the facts alleged by the plaintiff would give rise to a
"classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every State." Id. at 697;
cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976) (prison physician's negligence may be
actionable in state courts, but is not a constitutional deprivation within ambit of § 1983).
The effect of Paul seems to be that injury to reputation, standing alone, like injuries to other
non-constitutionally derived rights, is not sufficient to invoke the protections of § 1983.
Finally, in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court determined that "[tlo the
extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of
constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formida-
ble than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages." Id. at 256-57. In the context
of student suspensions from public schools ordered by school officials without proper due
process protections, the Carey Court declined to apply the "common-law tort [rule] of
[presumed] damages," id. at 258, and stated "that substantial damages should be awarded
only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter
or punish malicious deprivations of rights." Id. at 266.
12 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
130 Id.
'3 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). For the text of the statute, see note 38 supra.
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tutional law.' 3 Recently, in Robertson v. Wegmann, 3 3 the Supreme
Court utilized section 1988 and incorporated Louisiana's survivor-
ship law which mandated the abatement of a section 1983 action. 3
While this result may be questioned in light of the policies and
concerns of section 1983,'1 it is suggested that had the suit been
maintained on a Bivens-Turpin theory, dismissal would not have
occurred. Under the Rules of Decision Act,' 3 a similar choice of law
provision which seems applicable to constitutional causes of action,
the Court has generally taken a chary approach to incorporating
state law which, while not in conflict with federal law, would not
serve the purposes to which the federal law is directed.'3 7 After
Monell it cannot be gainsaid that section 1983 provides an effective
remedy for injury resulting from municipal activity that violates the
fourteenth amendment. In addition, as outlined above, a broad con-
gruence exists between the section 1983 and constitutional causes
of action.' 38 On this basis alone it would seem reasonable to conclude
that the statutory remedy pro tanto displaces the constitutional
right of action.'39 Whether the direct constitutional action survives
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
'3 98 S. Ct. 1991 (1978).
,3' Id. at 1997. In Robertson, a § 1983 action was commenced by Clay Shaw against Jim
Garrison and others for malicious prosecution. Shaw died before trial and the executor of his
estate, Wegmann, was substituted as plaintiff. 98 S. Ct. at 1993. The state survivorship
statute dictated that the action abate, since an executor was not within one of the classes of
beneficiaries in whose favor this action would survive. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West
1971). Since § 1983 contained no provision for survivorship, the Court, reversing both lower
courts, declined to apply a "rule of absolute survivorship" in § 1983 actions. 98 S. Ct. at 1995.
It was suggested, however, that had "Shaw's death [been] caused by the deprivation of
rights for which he sued under § 1983," the result might have been different. 98 S. Ct. at
1997.
11 See 98 S. Ct. at 1997-2002 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'' 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
' 98 S. Ct. at 1999 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'3 Despite the similar contours of the two causes of action, it is to be noted that where
respondeat superior principles are incorporated into the constitutional cause of action the
probability of recovery of damages is unarguably enhanced. It might be thought, therefore,
that in such cases, because particular constitutional guarantees are better implemented by
the constitutional right of action than by the § 1983 remedy, that the former approach should
survive. Yet, as the first circuit has noted: "While a direct action . . . might often provide
superior opportunities for compensation, the existence of a statutory remedy which is de-
signed to implement the constitutional guarantee may itself render the Bivens analysis inap-
propriate." Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977).
'"' The notion that the existence of a federal statutory damages remedy which effectuates
a constitutionally recognized right will supplant or pre-empt an equivalent constitutionally
based, but judicially created, right of action has been alluded to by some commentators. For
example, Professor Monaghan, who views the Bivens remedy as a product of the constitu-
tional common law, see Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 24 (1975), also acknowledges that this constitutional
common law is "subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress." Id. at
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after Monell remains problematic, however, in the absence of defini-
tive judicial resolution of the issue.4 0 Only if it is found that the
constitutional cause of action is still "necessary" or "appropriate"
should it survive. It is suggested that a search for such justifications
is likely to be unavailing. Even assuming the continued viability of
both types of actions, since they are so similar, federal courts can
be expected to adhere to the oft-expressed principle that a statutory
claim, rather than a constitutional claim, should provide the basis
upon which a decision is reached."'
PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION AFTER Monell
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction empowers a federal court
to adjudicate claims over which it has no independent basis of juris-
diction.' While the absolute immunity of municipalities from suit
3. Of course, existence of the § 1983 remedy for unconstitutional municipal activity is due,
not to the Congress, but to the Court itself. The judicial development of the § 1983 damage
remedy against municipalities in Monell may thus indicate, as Justice Powell suggested, that
the Court would rather "confess error and set the record straight" than "constitutionalize a
cause of action against local government that Congress intended to create in 1871." 98 S. Ct.
at 2047 (Powell, J., concurring). Since the Monell Court's choice of the § 1983 remedy would
seem to have decided, albeit sub silentio, that it, and not the Bivens approach, "appropriately
effectuates the mandate of the Constitution," see Dellinger, supra note 115, at 1548 n.89, the
conclusion seems inescapable that the development of the constitutional right of action is at
an end in the fourteenth amendment context.
11 It appears that the second and eighth circuits will have the first opportunities to
determine whether the constitutional cause of action remains viable after Monell. See Turpin
v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven v.
Turpin, 47 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925
(8th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3122 (1978).
"I See California Dep't of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 124 (1971); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402 (1970); Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
"I There exists a plethora of scholarly comment on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
in general. See 13 C. WmIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE §
3567 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MELER & COOPER]; Shakman, The New Pendent
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. Rv. 262 (1968); Note, The Evolution and
Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018
(1962); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 657 (1968); Com-
ment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards A Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1263 (1975). For specific material on pendent party jurisdiction, see 13
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra, at 457-62; Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem
of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1972); Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and
Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 127 (1977); Comment, Federal Pendent Subject
Matter Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons
Not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1973); Comment,
The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pendent Party Jurisdiction, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1357
(1977); Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger
Reconsidered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978) [hereinafter cited as YALE].
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under section 1983 remained in existence, the federal courts were
without jurisdiction to hear state claims against them.' With the
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), first explored the
reach of article III of the Constitution. Strictly speaking, no pendent state law claim was
involved in Osborn. Rather, the case involved Osborn's claim that the statute, 3 Stat. 266
(18161, which authorized the Bank of the United States to "sue and be sued. . . in any circuit
court of the United States," was unconstitutional because it permitted adjudication of ques-
tions of state law that would inevitably be involved in suits by the bank. This was claimed
to be in derogation of article I of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. In, § 2, which limited
the judicial power of the federal courts to cases "arisfing] under the Constitution . . . or
laws of the United States." Observing that "[t]here is scarcely any case, every part of which
depends on the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at
820, Chief Justice Marshall concluded "that when a question to which the judicial power of
the Union is extended by the constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in
the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, even though other
questions of fact or of law may be involved in it." Id. at 823.
Following Osborn, in Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), the Court per-
mitted joinder of state and federal claims where a Kentucky statute authorizing rate set-
ting for intrastate railroad operations was alleged to be unconstitutional, and a rate order
promulgated thereunder was alleged to be unauthorized. The federal constitutional claim,
although "substantial" enough to vest jurisdiction in the federal court, id. at 191, was not
decided by the Court since it held that the rate order was unauthorized under the terms of
the state statute. Thus, an adjudication of the federal claim would have been advisory. Id.
at 193.
In Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), the Court permitted joinder of claims of copy-
right infringement under federal law and unfair competition under state law. Unlike Siler,
jurisdiction over the federal claim was statutorily derived. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320,
§ 34, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (repealed 1948). The Court, implicitly stressing the article III "case
or controversy" requirement, announced a "rule of general application":
The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct grounds in
support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal
question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged,
one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal question
averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the
federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case
upon the non-federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the non-federal
cause of action.
289 U.S. at 246 (emphasis in original).
As UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), recognized after adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Hum's "test" became the "source of considerable confusion." Id. at 724.
Gibbs involved an attempted joinder of a state claim alleging intentional interference with
business contracts with an action under § 303(a) of the Labor-Management Act, 29 U.S.C. §
187(a) (1976). Expanding considerably what it termed an "unnecessarily grudging approach"
under Hum, the Gibbs Court posited its own two-part "test" for the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction. 383 U.S. at 725-26. First, "[tihe state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact," such that a single "constitutional 'case'" is present. Id.
at 725. Second, the court must be satisfied that "considerations of judicial economy, conveni-
ence, and fairness to litigants" are served by taking jurisdiction of the state-derived claim.
Id. at 726.
"4 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See generally Davis, Tort Liability of Govern-
ment Units, 40 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1956); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
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removal of Monroe's bar, it is now permissible, where the require-
ments for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction otherwise are satis-
fied, for pendent state law claims against municipalities to be de-
cided in the federal courts.' This should be true even in cases where
liability under state law is based on notions of respondeat supe-
rior. 45
The bar placed on the adjudication in federal courts of indepen-
dent state law claims against municipalities under the Monroe rule
was articulated in Aldinger v. Howard. '" In Aldinger, the plaintiff
commenced section 1983 actions against Spokane county and sev-
eral of its officials.' In addition, the plaintiff lodged a state law
claim' against the county, over which the district court was alleged
to have pendent jurisdiction. Having dismissed the section 1983
claim against the county on the authority of Monroe, the district
court concluded that it had, no basis for exercising pendent jurisdic-
tion over the state claim.' Following an affirmance by the ninth
circuit,' 0 the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff's contentions that ju-
risdiction over the state claim against the county could be based on
the presence of a viable section 1983 claim against the individual
defendants,' 5' and that it was not necessary to find an independent
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1 (1972); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1963); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); Comment, Judicial Abrogation
of Governmental and Sovereign Immunity: A National Trend With a Pennsylvania
Perspective, 78 DICK. L. REv. 365 (1973); Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The
Doctrine and Some of Its Recent Developments, 40 MINN. L. REv. 234 (1956).
' See notes 156-61 and accompanying text infra.
S At present, the issue whether to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims
does not involve any examination of the similarity of the "rights" asserted, or sought to be
vindicated, in the state and federal claims. Rather, the focus is on the factual similarity of
the claims. See note 142 supra. Thus, while respondeat superior liability may be established
by state law and is not permissible in the § 1983 context, thereby implicating different
"rights," the presence of the federal courts' power to exercise pendent jurisdiction should be
unaffected by any such dissimilarity between the two causes of action. One commentator,
however, suggests that a "common nucleus of operative law" should underlie the federal and
state claims in order for pendent jurisdiction to be exercised in conformity with article III.
See YALE, supra note 142, at 648-50.
427 U.S. 1, 17 (1976), aff'g 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 3-4.
,, See 513 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1975). The state law claim was based on WASH. REv.
CODE § 4.92.090 (1976), which abolished the governmental immunity previously enjoyed by
county governments. The Washington statute in question imposed vicarious liability in both
tort and contract action. Id. § 4.08.120.
"1 427 U.S. at 5.
25 513 F.2d at 1258.
,' 427 U.S. at 17. Prior to Aldinger, the sixth, seventh and ninth circuits had refused to
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basis of federal jurisdiction over the county.' The Aldinger Court
reasoned that since Monroe had held that municipalities were not
"persons" within the meaning of section 1983 and since the federal
claim to which plaintiff sought to append her state law claim was
based on section 1983, ,-3 the federal courts were not free to exercise
pendent jurisdiction.' 54 It was apparent that the Court's reluctance
to permit adjudication of the state law claim derived from a deter-
mination not to permit suits against municipalities indirectly where
it had consistently refused to do so directly.' 5
The Monell decision would seem to obviate Aldinger's primary
concern that pendent party jurisdiction not be used as a bootstrap-
ping mechanism.'56 In the future, the propriety of exercising federal
jurisdiction over state law claims against a municipality may be
determined on traditional pendent jurisdiction grounds since an
independent basis of federal jurisdiction over municipalities now
exists under section 1983.57 The requirements for exercising pendent
join state law claims against municipalities with § 1983 actions against individual employees
of those entities. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973);
Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
Other lower federal courts, however, approved of this practice. See, e.g., Glover v. City of New
York, 401 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 446 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Reed
v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 372 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Greenway v. Thompson, 368
F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Eidschun v. Pierce, 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
Where the jurisdictional basis for a federal civil rights suit against a local government is
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), the general federal question statute, apparently only two circuits
have expressly permitted a district court in the exercise of its discretion to adjudicate pendent
state law claims against the local entity. Pitrone v. Mercadante, 572 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978); Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d
112, 116 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3122 (1978); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 96
(D.C. Cir. 1974). It would seem, however, that the practice would be permissible in those
other jurisdictions wherein the constitutional cause of action has been approved, since all that
is required for pendent jurisdiction purposes is a "substantial constitutional claim." See
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974).
1"2 See 427 U.S. at 12-13. Ms. Aldinger had asserted that since Gibbs' two-part test, see
note 142 supra, was satisfied, it was essentially irrelevant whether the party against whom
her state law claim was directed was otherwise not amenable to suit in federal court. The
Aldinger Court, however, stated that a federal court's article I "power" to adjudicate pen-
dent claims depends on the presence of three elements. There must be a "substantial" federal
claim, see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 539-41 (1974), coextensive factual bases for the
two claims and the statute conferring jurisdiction over the federal claim must not contain an
express or implicit negation of jurisdiction over the state law claim. 427 U.S. at 18.
"" See 427 U.S. at 4.
1 Id. at 17.
' See id. at 16-17.
,54 See Owen Equip. and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 98 S. Ct. 2396, 2402 n.12 (1978).
57 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2032 (1978).
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jurisdiction over state law claims against a municipality should thus
turn on whether the state and federal claims derive from a "common
nucleus of operative fact" and whether judicial economy, fairness
and convenience to the litigants would be served by adjudicating all
claims in the federal forum.15 Since section 1983 was enacted to
make a federal forum available to individuals deprived of rights,
privileges or immunities, 59 it is suggested that the discretionary
power of the federal judiciary to remit litigants to the state forum
should be narrowly circumscribed.' As a practical matter, the prev-
alence of state laws imposing liability on municipalities on a respon-
deat superior basis illustrates the dramatic effect that the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine should have in section 1983 suits. 6'
BEYOND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: Monell, SECTION 1983 AND THE STATES
Many pre-Monell cases seized upon Monroe's holding that
municipalities were not "persons" within the ambit of section 1983
to justify, a fortiori, the conclusion that various state agencies and
state governments were not amenable to suit under section 1983.162
Generally, these decisions evidenced no discernible rationale to sup-
port this conclusion; rather, they assumed that Congress' exclusion
of municipalities from suit under section 1983 necessarily implied a
similar state immunity.'63 It is submitted that Monell, despite the
' See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966).
'.' Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); accord, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
180 (1961); id. at 193 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 251-52 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I It should be noted that the Supreme Court has explained the operation of the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction in the following terms: "[lit is evident from Gibbs that pendent state
law claims are not always, or even almost always, to be dismissed and not adjudicated. On
the contrary, given advantages of economy and convenience and no unfairness to litigants,
Gibbs contemplates adjudication of these claims." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-46
(1974) (dictum).
"I Moreover, in many states the degree of state protection of civil rights, due process
guarantees, and other Bill of Rights restraints on governmental conduct has equaled, if not
outstripped, federal protection of those rights. State constitutions and state judicial interpre-
tation of their provisions have become primary and powerful guarantees of individual rights.
See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAiRv.
L. REv. 489 (1977). Whatever benefits accrue from this development, as well as from the
widespread use of respondeat superior principles among the states, should be realizable since
decision of a pendent state claim is generally preferred to the adjudication of federal claims.
Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
" See, e.g., Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868
(1974); United States v. County of Phildelphia, 413 F.2d 84, 86 n.2 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1046 (1970). Professor Engdahl also noted that so long as Monroe survived, states
could not be § 1983 "persons." Engdahl, supra note 143, at 74 n.361.
"I Engdahl, supra note 143, at 74 n.361.
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Court's limitation of its holding "to local government units which
are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment pur-
poses," ' may be the precursor to state government liability under
section 1983.
In resolving this issue, initially it must be determined whether
states are included within the term "persons" for purposes of section
1983. Since Monell made clear that "bodies politic and corporate"
were understood by the Forty-second Congress to be encompassed
in the "persons" made liable for violations of section 1983,165 there
would seem to be no principled basis on which to exclude state
governments from the ambit of the section.'66 Moreover, as the
Monell Court determined in relation to municipalities, there is
nothing of substance in the debates on H.R. 320 that would indicate
any significant congressional antipathy to imposition of section 1983
liability on state government defendants.'67
"1 98 S. Ct. at 2035 n.54. No eleventh amendment bar was implicated in Monell since
local government entities do not share in its protections. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
,, 98 S. Ct. at 2035.
III See Hutto v. Finney, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2580-81 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Hutto, Justice Brennan observed that, in Monell, the Dictionary Act of 1871's provision for
inclusion of "bodies politic and corporate" in the term "person" led the Court to conclude
that municipal governments as "bodies politic" were intended by Congress to be suable in
federal court for violations of § 1983. 98 S. Ct. at 2580 (Brennan, J., concurring). According
to him, "bodies politic and corporate" could now be, and "certainly" was in 1871, read to
include states. Id. (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978); United
States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 109 (C.C. Va. 1823) (Marshall, C.J.)). A recent district court
decision has adopted this rationale to find states to be "persons" for § 1983 purposes. See
Aldredge v. Turlington, 47 U.S.L.W. 2371 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 1978).
" There are indications that at least some congressmen perceived no constitutional
barriers to imposing damage liability directly on the states. Representative Willard, one of
the Sherman amendment's staunchest opponents, felt that
if there is to be any liability visited upon anybody for a failure to perform that duty
[imposed by the amendment], such liability should be brought home to the State
... [In my judgment, this section would be liable to very much less objection,
both in regard to its justice and its constitutionality, if. . . suit might be brought
against the State, .... and . . . judgment might be enforced upon the treasury of
the State.
GLOBE, supra note 2, at 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard).
In fact, at the time of the debates no constitutional bar to suits against a state by its
own citizens had yet been perceived. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821).
That the eleventh amendment extended to bar such suits was not decided until Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), a decision that has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Engdahl,
supra note 143, at 28-32.
At the time of the Act's passage, there were few reported cases in the federal courts in
which citizens brought suit against their own states. One commentator notes that this is
because there existed no federal jurisdictional statute upon which to base such suits. See
Engdahl, supra note 143, at 13 n.56. It was not until 1875 that general federal question
jurisdiction was created. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470. Additionally,
since the states generally barred access to their own courts for most suits against the sover-
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Once having determined that state governments are "persons"
for section 1983 purposes, it remains to be considered whether the
eleventh amendment bars imposition of damages. The eleventh
amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit. . . commenced
. . . against [a state] by Citizens of another State . . . . 18 While
the amendment has been interpreted to prohibit suits initiated by
a state's own citizens169 as well, a state may consent 7 ° to suit or may
be deemed to have waived171 its eleventh amendment protection.
Modern eleventh amendment jurisprudence begins with
Parden v. Terminal Railway, 1 2 wherein the Court introduced the
concept of "constructive waiver.1' 73 The Parden Court concluded
that maintenance of an action under the Federal Employees Liabil-
ity Act 174 against the State of Alabama was permissible despite the
eleventh amendment.17 5 The Court read a constructive waiver of
eleventh amendment protection into the legislative scheme enacted
pursuant to Congress' plenary commerce-clause power and the
eign, it is hardly remarkable that the Supreme Court so infrequently reviewed decisions
handed down by state courts of last resort which involved suits by a citizen against his own
state. See generally Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. CoLO. L. REv.
139 (1977); Engdahl, supra note 143.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
I, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The eleventh amendment also has been inter-
preted not to bar suits brought by the United States against a state, United States v. Missis-
sippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965), and by one state against another state. South Dakota v.
North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315-21 (1904).
Suits against state officers in their official capacity for injunctive relief are not barred
by the eleventh amendment. In such situations, the officer's unconstitutional conduct is
deemed to strip him of his official character. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Where a
suit for damages is commenced against a state officer in his official capacity or representative
capacity, however, whether in form a damage action or an equitable action, the eleventh
amendment bar applies. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887).
11 See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). This consent must appear from
"express language or. . . such overwhelming implication from the text [of a state waiver of
immunity statute] as would leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Murray
v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
"7 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964).
17 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
I Id. at 191-96. In Parden, "for the first time ... a State's claim of immunity against
suit by an individual [met] . . . a suit brought upon a cause of action expressly created by
Congress." Id. at 187.
' 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
'7' 377 U.S. at 185. Jurisdictional provisions of the FELA legislation specifically sub-
jected a "common carrier" to suit in federal district court for injuries to its employees. See
id. at 185-86.
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state's subsequent operation of the railroad.' The ensuing cases
indicated that the reach of the constructive waiver doctrine was to
be limited to instances where there was a clear legislative intent
that states be made amenable to suit.'77 This reflected an attempt
,T' See id. at 191-92.
' Almost a decade later, in 1973, the Court limited the reach of Parden's "constructive
waiver" in Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). Although the Employees Court reaffirmed the theoretical basis
of congressional power to override the states' eleventh amendment immunity from suits by
their own citizens in federal courts, see id. at 283-84, it stated that the power would not be
given effect absent a clear legislative intent that states be made amenable to suit. See id. at
285. Yet, the clarity of congressional intent required to override the state's eleventh amend-
ment immunity was described in seemingly contradictory terms. On the one hand, the Court
stated that "we have found not a word in the history of the 1966 amendments to indicate a
purpose of Congress to make it possible for a citizen of that State or another State to sue
that State in the federal courts." Id. (emphasis added). The Court then asserted that "[ilt
would . . . be surprising. . . to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional
immunity without changing the old § 16(b) under which she could not be sued or indicating
in some way by clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept away." Id. (em-
phasis added).
The Court found that the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976), provided
sufficient protection to state hospital workers when it authorized the Secretary of Labor to
seek equitable relief, including backpay, on behalf of aggrieved workers. 411 U.S. at 285-86.
The Court rejected the notion that in bringing state hospitals and schools within the Act's
ambit, an action first approved in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), as a valid exercise
of commerce power, but later found impermissible on tenth amendment grounds in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the states thereby were held to have con-
structively waived their eleventh amendment immunity against suit in the federal courts.
411 U.S. at 285.
The decision has been criticized as inconsistent with Parden in the sense that in both
cases the statutory grant of jurisdiction literally extended to governmental defendants. See
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional
Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1241-47 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Field (I)]. A ground of distinction, however, is that a proprietary or profit-making activ-
ity, operating a railroad, was involved in Parden, while in Employees nonprofit governmental
activities were at issue. See id. at 1245-46.
In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court determined that the "mere fact"
of state participation in a federally-funded, but state-administered, social welfare program
was "not sufficient to establish consent . . . to be sued in the federal courts." Id. at 673. In
Edelman, a § 1983 action was pressed against various state officials charged with administra-
tion of joint federal-state programs providing Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled [AABD].
415 U.S. at 653. Alleging noncompliance with federal regulations concerning benefits eligibil-
ity and regulations mandating that claims for aid be processed within specified time periods,
id. at 653 & n.1, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as an order for
payment of AABD benefits wrongfully withheld. Id. at 656. The seventh circuit approved all
relief requested, finding that the eleventh amendment was no bar to an award of monetary
compensation (the amount of benefits wrongfully withheld) since it viewed such an award as
"equitable restitution" rather than damages. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985. 993-94 (7th Cir.
1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Since the officials were named
in their official or representative capacities, id. at 658, any money recovery, however denomi-
nated, would be paid from the state treasury. As such, the eleventh amendment appeared to
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by the Supreme Court to reconcile the competing interests of state
sovereignty and the protection of individuals against unlawful or
unconstitutional state action.
Of greater relevance for purposes of section 1983 is a recent
development in which the Supreme Court has found that the four-
teenth amendment contains significant limitations on the notion of
state sovereignty found in the eleventh amendment. 17 This view
proceeds from the premise that the states, in ratifying the Constitu-
tion, impliedly ceded to the national government certain of their
sovereign attributes .179 Utilizing this reasoning, the requisite
"threshold fact of congressional authorization" necessary to sue
states under a particular statute was found in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer. "0 In Fitzpatrick, employment discrimination suits were au-
thorized to be brought in the federal courts for recovery of money
damages by private parties against a state government under the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.181 Noting that the
statute was passed under the enforcement provisions of section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, the Court stated that when Congress so
acts, it not only "exercis[es] legislative authority that is plenary
within the terms of the constitutional grant," it exercises "that
authority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state au-
thority." " Thus, the Court ruled that Congress could empower pri-
bar imposition of liability, even though the state was not named as a defendant. See Kenne-
cott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department
of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). Examining the only statutory provision of the Social Secu-
rity Act which imposed sanctions against non-complying states, the Court found that "by its
terms [it] did not authorize suit against anyone, and. . . fell far short of a waiver by a...
State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id. at 674. The Edelman Court thus was unable
to discover "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants
which literally included States." Id. at 672. It accordingly overturned the seventh circuit's
judgment that benefits "wrongfully withheld" be paid to the plaintiffs. Id. at 678. Both
Justices Douglas, id. at 685, and Marshall, id. at 690-92, 693-96 (citing Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970)), thought that § 1983 did authorize suit against the state officials.
"I See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); note 114 and accompanying text supra.
A number of excellent commentaries on the interplay between the eleventh and fourteenth
amendments have appeared in recent years. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 167; Engdahl, supra
note 143, at 67-70; Field (II), supra note 177; Nowak, supra note 114; Intergovernmental
Immunities, supra note 41. See also Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YAx L.J. 221 (1973).
1" Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
" 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)).
" PuB. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2-B, 10, 11, 13, 86 Stat. 103 (amended 1975 & 1976) (amending
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -15 (1970)).
1" 427 U.S. at 453-56; see note 110 supra.
1978]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:66
vate individuals to sue states for employment discrimination in fed-
eral courts.1 3
Similarly, in Hutto v. Finney,"4 an award of attorney's fees to
be paid ultimately by a state agency, pursuant to the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,185 was upheld over objections
that congressional intent to impose liability upon states for pay-
ment of attorney's fees in section 1983 actions was not sufficiently
explicit. ' The majority indicated that since the 1976 Act was
passed pursuant to Congress' power under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment and was intended to apply to the states, the
eleventh amendment did not bar an award of fees.'"7
Since the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted pursuant to
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the holdings in Fitzpatrick
and Hutto would appear to foreclose the argument that the eleventh
amendment precludes an award of damages against a state sued
under section 1983. A review of the several opinions written in those
cases, however, indicates a wide divergence of views among the
members of the Supreme Court. While some members would con-
tinue to hold that the fourteenth amendment presents a special case
"1 427 U.S. at 456. In dictum, Justice Rehnquist observed that "Congress may, in deter-
mining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits against states or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." Id. (citations omitted); see Field (II), supra
note 177, at 1237-38.
98 S. Ct. 2526 (1978).
, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, PuB. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970)). For a discussion of this legislation, see Note, The Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 603 (1978).
"' 98 S. Ct. at 2576. Attorney's fees were stated in the Act to be "a part of the costs"
taxable against a losing party. The majority stated that the eleventh amendment had never
been a bar to such awards. Id. at 2576-77. Since Hutto involved "expenses incurred in litiga-
tion seeking only prospective [equitable] relief," earlier cases involving "retroactive
[monetary] liability for prelitigation conduct," were distinguished. Id. While the award of
attorney's fees concededly had a compensatory aspect, the majority equated it with a fine
for civil contempt and thus it was viewed to be merely ancillary to the injunctive relief
awarded. Id. at 2574, 2576 n.24.
1" Id. at 2575-76, 2578 n.31. In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan stated that legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment should be given sui generis treat-
ment under the constructive waiver doctrine. 98 S. Ct. at 2580 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented from the majority's award of attorney's
fees under the 1976 Act. 98 S. Ct. at 2581 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He viewed the applicability of the constructive waiver doctrine to be predicated upon
congressional enactment of a statute which, by its express wording, provides for imposition
of money damage liability against states. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
Justice Powell's view on the requisite explicitness of language imposing liability on state
governments finds support among commentators. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Immunities,
supra note 41, at 695. See also Wellington, supra note 178, at 264.
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in relation to the eleventh amendment, others would treat legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to section 5 of the amendment in an identical
manner to legislation passed under the commerce clause or other
article I grants."" Additionally, the Court appears to be divided on
the issue whether the test for abrogating the states' eleventh amend-
ment immunity from suit in federal courts should be a "clear state-
ment" in the language of a statute, or whether a clear congressional
purpose found in a statute's legislative history will suffice to effect
a "constructive waiver."1"9 The rationale posited by supporters of a
clear statement test essentially derives from the salutary policy of
ensuring that "Congress has considered the federalism interests
compromised by suits against states."'' 0 It is likely that the assur-
ance of appropriate congressional consideration of such federalism
interests also may be found where clear expressions of congressional
intent to impose damages liability are found in the legislative his-
tory of a statute. It is submitted that such assurances may be found
in section 1983's legislative history"9 ' as demonstrated by the Monell
Court's exegesis, thereby making imposition of section 1983 liability
on state governments possible under either interpretation of the
constructive-waiver doctrine. 9 '
Whether state governments may be sued in federal courts for
violations of section 1983, notwithstanding the eleventh amend-
ment, is a question whose resolution would seem to have broad
implications for this nation's federal structure. 9 3 Practical consider-
ations, involving the wisdom of imposing potentially substantial
liability on the states,'94 are also inextricably a part of this contro-
versy.
193 Compare 98 S. Ct. at 2578 n.31 (Stevens, J.), and 98 S. Ct. at 2580 (Brennan, J.,
concurring), with 98 S. Ct. at 2582-84 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I See note 177 supra. Compare 98 S. Ct. at 2575-76, 2578 n.31 (Stevens, J.), with 98 S.
Ct. at 2582-83 & n.6 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' Intergovernmental Immunities, supra note 41, at 695.
"' See note 167 supra.
' Shortly after the Monell decision was announced, the Court, in a per curiam opinion,
indicated that the eleventh amendment bars equitable relief against a state government
which engages in penal practices violative of § 1983. Alabama v. Pugh, 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978)
(per curiam). In reaching its conclusion the Court discussed neither Fitzpatrick nor Monell,
two decisions which would seem to weigh heavily on the issue whether state governments are
amenable to suit under § 1983. It is submitted, therefore, that Pugh should not be read to
foreclose further inquiry in this area.
" Cf. 98 S. Ct. at 2581-82 (Powell, J., dissenting) (creation of obligation on part of states
to pay awarded attorney's fees will "undermine the values of federalism served by the Elev-
enth Amendment" unless clear congressional authorization to do so is present). See also
Nowak, supra note 114, at 1469.
Cf. 98 S. Ct. at 1053 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (decrying possible financial impact
on local government).
1978]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:66
CONCLUSION
This Note has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in
Monell v. Department of Social Services, lifting the absolute im-
munity from section 1983 liability accorded to municipalities by
Monroe v. Pape, should have a broad impact on section 1983 juris-
prudence. The section 1983 damage remedy should now become the
primary, if not exclusive, means of redress of constitutional viola-
tions by municipalities. Further, Monell should be read to abrogate
the vitality of Aldinger v. Howard, thus permitting federal courts
to adjudicate pendent state law claims against municipalities.
Lastly, it is suggested that Monell may well foreshadow the impo-
sition of section 1983 liability on state governments. While this
Note has attempted to assess Monell's impact on several aspects
of civil rights litigation, several significant issues, alluded to in
MoneUl, remain to be resolved by the lower federal courts.'5
Thomas M. Dawson
" See 98 S. Ct. at 2041. Since governmental entities enjoyed an absolute immunity prior
to Monell, the question whether they should be accorded a "qualified" or "good faith" im-
munity from damage liability under § 1983 has not been treated extensively. See Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961). If development of a qualified "immunity" from § 1983 liability
in favor of municipalities proceeds by analogy from that enunciated in a series of Supreme
Court cases beginning with Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and culminating re-
cently with Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978), the "immunity" is not a true immunity
in the sense that no liability attaches ab initio. Rather, the "immunity" may more properly
be termed a defense. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-58 (1967). This precludes the
official from terminating the action at an early stage, as on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1974). See generally
Lehmann, supra note 162; Developments, supra note 13, at 1209-17; see also Butz v. Econ-
omou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2919 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thus, the state or local official raising the defense will normally have to proceed to trial. See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-49
(1974).
In an excellent analysis of the question whether the liability of officers and their govern-
mental employers should be coextensive, Professor Bermann proposes an "exclusive govern-
mental liability model," possibly supplemented by a right of indemnification accruing to the
governmental employer. See Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability,
77 COLUm. L. Rv. 1175, 1213 (1977). Such a model would assure victims of tortious govern-
ment activity compensation for their injuries, while "simultaneously protecting the individ-
ual official from excessive personal liability." Id.
One commentator has concluded that the policies behind according individual officers
at least a qualified immunity from § 1983 liability are not apposite to the question whether
municipalities should be accorded an immunity from Bivens liability. See Damage Remedies,
supra note 19, at 955-58. First, it would not be "unjust" to hold a local government entity
liable for its own constitutional transgressions, particularly where several individual officials
are responsible for the plaintiff's injury. Second, any chilling effect on the decisionmaking
of individual officers would be minimal in comparison with cases involving imposition of un-
limited liability on individual officers. Id. Many courts have, in fact, followed this course.
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 934 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977); Hander v.
San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1975).
